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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Criminal Conspiracy in North Carolina.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years probably no offense has received as much newspaper
comment and public attention as that of criminal conspiracy.1 The
famous Appalachian convictions have recently been reversed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 2 Prosecutors
hive been charged with using the conspiracy indictment as a substitute
for the gathering of evidence.3 Judge Clark, in a concurring opinion
in the Appalachian reversals, was moved to suggest that the case
should never have been prosecuted. "For in America we still respect
the dignity of the individual, and even an unsavory character is not to
be imprisoned- except on definite proof of specific crime."4
Unlike the labor union prosecutions of the early nineteen hundreds,
the controversial issue in conspiracy trials today is the quantum and
quality of proof required for a conspiracy conviction and not the type
of conduct which is punishable as a conspiracy.; Although newspaper
and law review controversy over what the law requires (or ought to
require) as an objective of the agreement before that agreement is a
criminal conspiracy has receded, the subject is far from settled.0 This
article will attempt to show the substantive and procedural develop-
ment of the law of criminal conspiracy in North Carolina.7
ORGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRIME
The early development of conspiracy as a criminal offense is re-
corded not in judicial opinions but in the Parliament Rolls of England.8
'See, e.g., the series in the Raleigh News and Observer, Nov. 23, 1960, p. 4,
dealing with the conviction of a group of textile union members and officers for
conspiracy to dynamite certain facilities appurtenant to the mill in the course of
a prolonged strike. So great was the public interest, these articles were published
on the first anniversary of the convictions. The North Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed the convictions in State v. Walker, 251 N.C. 465, 112 S.E2d 61, cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 832 (1960).
2285 F2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960). The opinion is reported in full at page 32
of the New York Times, Nov. 29, 1960 (city ed.).
* Note, 35 No=R DAmE LAW. 446 (1960).
'285 F.2d 408, 420 (2d Cir. 1960).
1 See SAYRE Criminal Conspiracy, 35 Hxv. L. Rxv. 393 (1922), where the
author argues that normal labor union activity should not be punished as a con-spiracy.
'SeT generally Note, 68 H,.Rv. L. Rxv. 1056 (1955).
-7 For an excellent discussion of the law of conspiracy in the United States gen-
erally, see Developments-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. Rlv. 920 (1959).
1 WINFIELD, THE HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY AND AnusE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE
109 (1921).
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According to Professor Sayre, a very persuasive writer in the field,
the crime did not originate as a general offense at common law but
arose from a series of statutes dating from the time of Edward I.
These statutes were designed to punish those who "through Malice
intending to grieve other, do procure false Appeals to be made of
Homicides and other Felonies by Appellors.' 0 Professor Sayre con-
eludes that during the early period only conspiracies to abuse process
were criminal, and then only when an indictment was actually procured.
While there can be no doubt that the common early meaning of the
term "conspiracy" was confined to an abuse of legal process by a
combination of persons, there is evidence that as early as 1230 courts
were asked to rule upon combinations to effect other socially unde-
sirable ends."1 Thus, a suit was brought by one William Wymer,
complaining that several men had combined to ruin his mill by refusing
to trade with him and threatening injury to those who did. Though
the accused escaped on a technicality, William obtained a writ to the
sheriff of Stafford, protecting those who wished to trade with him.
2
In 1304, however, the famous Third Ordinance of Conspirators13 under-
took to define the term: "Conspirators be they that do confeder or
bind themselves by Oath, Covenant, or other Alliance, that every of
them shall aid and support the Enterprise of each other falsely and
maliciously to indite, [naming other abuses of process] ..... If this
statute were considered an exclusive definition of conspirators, the
crime would bear little resemblance to the modern conception of con-
spiracy.
In North Carolina, as in all American states, it was held at an
early date that conspiracy applied to agreements other than those for
the abuse of process.14 "[T]he statute [Third Ordinance of Con-
spirators] ... was only declaratory of the common law to the extent
of the crimes enumerated in the act, leaving the common law as appli-
cable to all other forms of conspiracy known to the law."' 5 The
question then arises as to what "other forms of conspiracy" were known
to the common law.
Prior to the seventeenth century, there is no record of a conviction
for criminal conspiracy other than for the abuse of process. 16 During
SSAYRE, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. Rxv. 393, 395 (1922). The earliest
statute was 13 Edw. 1, c. 12.
20 SAYRE, supra note 9.
21 WINFILD, op. cit. supra note 8, at 109.12 Bracton's Note Book Case 479 (1230). The case is indexed under "Con-
spiracy."
8 1304, 33 Edw. 1, c. 3.
14 State v. Howard, 129 N.C 584, 40 S.E. 71 (1901) ; State v. Younger, 12
N.C. 357 (1827) (conspiracy to get one drunk and cheat him at cards).
' State v. Howard, supra note 14, at 658, 40 S.E. at 75.
18 SAYRE, supra note 9.
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the seventeenth century, however, the original view of conspiracy as
an agreement for the abuse of legal process was rapidly disappearing.
In line with a broadening general concept of crime which was taking
form in the period,'7 lawyers began to argue that agreements to effec-
tuate almost any undesirable object should be punishable as a criminal
conspiracy.'
The first case actually departing from the abuse of process theory
was Rex v. Starling,'9 decided in 1665. There the defendants were
indicted for a conspiracy to impoverish certain farmers by depressing
the price of produce. The defendants argued that since impoverishment
of another with the intent to enrich oneself was not criminal the agree-
ment to attain that end was not a crime. Noting that to impoverish
the farmers would render them incapable of paying the King his reve-
nue, the court said that the bare conspiracy, without any act in further-
ance of it, constituted a criminal offense. The case is susceptible to
the interpretation that an agreement to do any undesirable act was
indictable, whether or not the contemplated act was itself a crime. Lord
Holt,20 however, observed that the gist of the offense in Starling was
injury to the public (deprivation of the King's revenue) and not merely
an agreement to do an undesirable act. Whatever the effect of Starling,
it is significant that in all other seventeenth century conspiracy convic-
ti6ns the object of the agreement was the commission of a criminal act.
Nevertheless, in 1716 Hawkins stated that "all confederacies what-
soever, wrongfully to prejudice a third person, are highly criminal at
common law."2' 1 It should be noted, however, that the statement was
inserted in Hawkins' discussion of conspiracy in its original meaning-
relating to abuse of process. If the phrase "wrongfully to prejudice"
is read in reference only to abuse of process, it is not objectionable.
But the cases after 1716 indicate that Hawlkins' statement was read to
apply to any agreement to do a "wrongful" act. In the light of this
-development Professor Sayre concludes that the modern crime of con-
spiracy is of illegitimate birth.'
Just five years after the Hawkins' statement it was held that tailors
who entered into a combination for the purpose of raising their wages
committed an indictable offense at common law.23 Then in Rex v. Ed-
1 See, e.g., Bagg's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 93b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1271 (1616), where
the court of King's Bench resolved that "no wrong or injury, either public or
private, can be done, but that it shall be (here) reformed or punished by due
course of law."
1 8WrrD, op. cit. supra note 8, at 112.
"1 Sid. 174, 82 Eng. Rep. 1039 (1665).
"Reg. v. Daniell, 6 Mod. 99, 87 Eng. Rep. 856 (1674).
1 HAwx. s, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 348 (1716).
SAYRE, supra note 9, at 402 n.28. Mr. Winfield, op. cit. supra note 8, was
of the opinion that the statement was of "questionable accuracy."
"Rex. v. Journeymen Tailors, 8 Mod. 10, 88 Eng. Rep. 9 (1721). Profes-
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wards24 the defendants were indicted for conspiracy to marry off a
pauper woman to a native of another county and thus relieve themselves
of the duty to support her. The decision was for the defendants, but
the court rendered a famous dictum which has since reverberated
through the North Carolina reports 9r "A bare conspiracy to do a law-
ful act to an unlawful end is a crime, though no act be done in conse-
quence thereof." The court apparently contemplated, as did Hawkins,
that the object need only be "wrongful" and not "criminal?'
In spite of repeated attacks upon the theory by legal writers, the
substance of Hawkins' statement is found in the North Carolina case
of State v. Younger.26 In the syllabus of that case it is said that "a
combination by two or more to do any unlawful act, or one prejudicial
to another, is indictable at common law as a conspiracy." This state-
ment is quoted with approval in the majority opinion of State v.
Howard.2 7 It was urged in the dissent in the Howard case that what
the court actually said in Younger was "that every conspiracy to injure
individuals, or to do acts which are unlawful, or prejudicial to the
community, is a conspiracy, and indictable." 28 The dissent pointed out
that there is an essential difference between acts prejudicial to an in-
dividual and acts prejudicial to the community and that in the Younger
case the conspiracy was to cheat by gambling. Since gambling was a
crime, the decision could have been upon the ground that the agreement
was to do a criminal act. The court in Younger, however, did not
choose to limit its" decision to so narrow a base. In addition, it would
seem that the Howard decision, concerning conspiracy to defraud, was
npt based upon the criminality of the acts contemplated since fraud
was, not a crime.
At this point in the development of North Carolina law, it would
appear that the court was ready to hold that a combination to effect
any wrong to another would be criminal.2 9 If conspiracy is of so broad
sor Sayre points out that in 1720 the statute, 7 Geo. 1, c. 13, p. 403, had ex-
pressly made the combination of tailors to raise their wages criminal. He con-
cludes that the case is therefore not authority for saying that the act need not be
criminal. But the court held that the indictment need not allege the statute
"because it is not the denial to work except for more wages that is allowed by
Statute, but it is for a Conspiracy to raise their wages, for which these defendants
are indicted." It seems that this holding must be taken as meaning that a
conspiracy to raise wages, even in the absence of the statute, was criminal.
' 8 Mod. 320, 88 Eng. Rep. 229 (1724).
"E.g., State v. Davenport, 227 N.C. 475, 42 S.E2d 686 (1947); State v.
Whiteside, 204 N.C. 710, 169 S.E. 711 (1933).
26 12 N.C. 357 (1827).
27 129 N.C. 584, 40 S.E. 71 (1901).
"Id. at 666, 40 S.E. at 77 (Emphasis by the dissenter.).
"2 The phrase "an unlawful act, or a lawful act in an unlawful manner," as
used in the North Carolina decisions, would seem to encompass all agreements
which were morally wrong, according to the standards of the community. justice
Douglas in his dissent in Howard made it abundantly clear that he thought How-
ard had gone this far. State v. Howard, 129 N.C. 584, 667, 40 S.E. 71, 74 (1901).
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a scope, the public prosecutor does indeed hold the key to the public
conscience.
Three years after the Howard case the court seemed to dispell the
notion that an agreement to do any "wrongful" act constituted a con-
spiracy. In State v. Van Pelt0 labor union members were indicted for
a conspiracy to impoverish a certain lumber dealer by publishing in a
newspaper a statement to the effect that he was unfair to organized
labor. The court reversed the conviction, saying that the word "un-
lawful" is of "such varied and uncertain import that it is unfortunate
that it was ever used to define a criminal act."3' 1 The Howard case
was distinguished on the ground that the bill of particulars in that case
had set out an indictable offense, namely obtaining money by false pre-
tenses. The court had some difficulty in distinguishing the language
of the Younger case. The court observed that it was not necessary to
find that the acts charged (getting the victim drunk and cheating him
at cards) were indictable at common law, apparently because they
were made criminal by a North Carolina statute. The court concluded,
"it is not our purpose to bring the decision of Younger's case into
question, but we can not accept the definition given of a criminal con-
spiracy."
3 2
The Van Pelt opinion undoubtedly went far toward pinning down
the ever elusive meaning of the word "unlawful" in the definition of
a criminal conspiracy. Thus when the court says that "a conspiracy
is an agreement by two or more persons to do an unlawful thing or
to do a lawful thing in an unlawful way or by unlawful means," 33 ac-
cording to Van Pelt, the word "unlawful" embraces all criminal acts,
whether felonies or misdemeanors3 4 But the acts conspired for need
Consequently, an agreement to effect a simple breach of contract, see Vertue v.
Lord Clive, 4 Burr. 2472, 98 Eng. Rep. 296 (1769), or to go upon the land of
another for sport would be punishable as a criminal conspiracy. But see the
statement of Lord Ellenborough in Rex v. Turner, 13 East. 228, 231, 104 Eng.
Rep. 357, 358 (1911): "I should be sorry to have it doubted whether persons
agreeing to go and sport upon another's.ground, in other words, to commit a civil
trespass, should be thereby in peril of an indictment for an offense which would
subject them to infamous punishment."
30 136 N.C. 633, 49 S.E. 177 (1904).
1 Id. at 616, 49 S.E. at 182.
32 Ibid.
"See State v. Walker, 251 N.C. 465, 468, 112 S.E.2d 61, 64, cert. denied, 364
U.S. 832 (1960), and cases there cited.
" Also, a conspiracy to cheat, though an individual may not have been guilty
as a common law cheat, was indictable at common law. This exception was
made necessary by the many loopholes in the technical crime of cheats. See
SAYRE, supra note 9, at 423. But the crime of obtaining property by false pre-
tense is no longer of such a technical nature. Thus an indictment charging a
conspiracy to "cheat and defraud" charges a combination for a criminal act in




not be indictable at common law; they may constitute a crime only by
express authority of statute3 5
This restricted meaning of the word "unlawful" conveyed by the
Van Pelt decision was short lived. In State v. Dalton8 the indictment
charged that the defendants, employees of one company, conspired to
"break up any sales made or sought to be made" by a rival company.
The defendants would follow employees of the rival company, deride
its product, and call its sales agents liars and thieves. Although the
anti-trust law37 was then in effect, the indictment was deemed to
charge the common law crime of conspiracy. The trial court quashed
the indictment and the State appealed. The court held, citing the
Howard case, that conspiracy at common law was properly charged.
Van Pelt was distinguished simply on the ground that there the con-
duct of the union members was not "unlawful." The court said, as to
the instant situation, that "a combination to use such means, reeking
with fraud and falsehood .. .has not been made lawful by any statute
nor recognized as permissible by the decision of any court." The
apparent meaning of this language and the decision is that agreements
to perpetrate wrongs which if perpetrated by an individual would re-
sult in civil liability only are indictable in North Carolina. The de-
fendants were clearly guilty of slander, but the same acts done in the
absence of an agreement would not be indictable.
As noted earlier, combinations to injure a person in his trade or
business have been especially frowned upon by the courts.8  Perhaps
the Dalton case is explainable on that basis. But the court made it
clear that the means used to injure the competitor was the factor re-
" The distinction between ends and means stressed by the definition appears
meaningless, at least from the substantive point of view. There may be sub-
stantial differences flowing from this distinction, however, in the manner in
which the offense must be charged in the indictment. See the text at note 148.
If the means by which any result is to be accomplished are "unlawful," then the
conspirators necessarily agree to do an "unlawful" act, and the gist of the offense
is the agreement. State v. Walker, 251 N.C. 465, 112 S.E2d 61, cert. denied,
364 U.S. 832 (1960). This should be contrasted with the civil action for damages
based on conspiracy where the gravamen of the action is the resultant injury and
not the agreement itself. Holt v: Holt, 232 N.C. 497, 61 S.E.2d 448 (1950).
3 168 N.C. 204, 83 S.E. 693 (1914).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §75-1 (1960).
"WIFm-D, op. cit. mipra note 8, at 111. As early as 1320 the English
Parliament is found to have taken action against confederations to interfere with
trade. But these acts, and such statutes as N.C. GEN. STAT. §75-1 (1953)
(anti-trust law), are designed to prohibit combinations which are prejudicial to
the whole economy. Thus the conspiracy conviction is used to protect a pressing
public interest. To stretch this concept to every combination that will prejudice
an individual seems a dangerous and unwarranted extension of the crime. There-
fore, where North Carolina's anti-trust laws bring every combination or act in
restraint of commerce which "violates the principles of the common law" within
the sanction of the courts, the provision should be deemed to refer only to
those combinations having a substantial adverse effect on the public. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 75-2 (1953) ; Mar-Hof Co. v. Rosenbacker, 176 N.C. 330, 97 S.E.
169 (1918).
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quiring criminal punishment. Thus any combination wrongfully to
prejudice an individual could be deemed a conspiracy, and it seems
that the court returned to the Younger definition. The cases subsequent
to Dalton, however, have not afforded the court an opportunity to
use the broad Younger definition, for the object of all conspiracies pre-
sented to the court since that decision has been the commission of a
criminal act.
39
In spite of a marked lack of decisions, there seems no reason to
doubt that a combination to abuse process, the original meaning of con-
spiracy, remains indictable in North Carolina.40 It seems likely that
an agreement to interfere with the administration of justice is also in-
dictable, even though such interference by one individual may not be
a crime.4 '
It is debatable whether a combination to defraud an individual,
when the scheme would not amount to a crime if executed by one per-
son, is a criminal conspiracy.42 It cannot be denied that at common
law43 and in other American jurisdictions44 the agreement to defraud
is indictable whether or not the fraud would be criminal. But it is at
least arguable that, if the fraud when consummated would not fall
within the broad converage of the North Carolina fraud statutes,"
"9 The reason for this lack of cases is not apparent. It is probably due to a
hesitancy of solicitors in seeking indictments where no crime is contemplated.
Examples of convictions since Van Pelt follow. Fraud on insurance companies:
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-214 (1953) ; State v. Hedrick, 236 N.C. 727, 73 S.E.2d 904
(1953) ; State v. Batts, 210 N.C. 659, 188 S.E. 99 (1936). Operation of lotteries:
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-290 (1953) ; State v. Gibson, 233 N.C. 691, 65 S.E.2d 508
(1951). Violation of election law: State v. Abernethy, 220 N.C. 226, 17 S.E.2d
29 (1941). Embezzlement: State v. Shipman, 202 N.C. 518, 163 S.E. 657 (1932).
Obtaining property by false pretenses: State v. Phillips, 240 N.C. 516, 82 S.E.2d
762 (1954). Violation of liquor laws: State v. Lippard, 223 N.C. 167, 25 S.E.2d
594 (1943). Malicious injury to property: State v. Hicks, 233 N.C. 511, 64
S.E.2d 871 (1951). Banks loans in excess of statutory limitation: State v. David-
son, 205 N.C. 735, 172 S.E. 489 (1934). Assault: State v. Aldridge, 206 N.C.
850, 175 S.E. 191 (1934). Bribery: State v. Smith, 237 N.C. 1, 74 S.E.2d 291
(1953). Bombing: State v. Caldwell, 249 N.C. 56, 105 S.E.2d 189 (1958).
O State v. Jackson, 82 N.C. 565 (1880) (conspiracy to impute infanticide).
"See State v. Enloe, 20 N.C. 508 (1839), where defendants were indicted
for conspiracy to destroy a warrant. Conviction was reversed, but upon the
ground that the warrant was not sufficiently described in the indictment.
2 In State v. Christianbury, 44 N.C. 46 (1852), the charge was that defendants
had agreed to convey property, one to the other, in order to defeat the prose-
cutor's judgment. They were indicted for conspiracy -to deceive. Conviction
was reversed because of the statute of limitations, but the court seemed con-
vinced that a crime was charged. But in State v. Trammell, 24 N.C. 379 (1842),
a conviction of conspiracy to defraud the prosecutor of land was reversed because
it was shown that in fact the defendants had only fraudulently entered their
names in the land book before the prosecutor had the opportunity to enter his.
Thus the indictment was insufficient because the prosecutor had no land.
"" See Developments-Conspiracy, 72 HAv. L. Ray. 920, 944 (1959).
"See, e.g., State v. Gannon, 75 Conn. 206, 52 AUt. 727 (1902); State v.
Burns, 215 Minn. 182, 9 N.W2d 518 (1943) (pursuant to a statute).
' N.C. GENz. STAT. §§ 14-100 to -117 (1953).
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the agreement should not be indictable. A holding to this effect would
go far to clarify the law in this area.
In the final analysis, it would seem virtually impossible to arrive at
any sound conclusion as to the type of agreement which is necessary
for a common law conspiracy conviction. Although North Carolina
solicitors and courts have contained the crime within reasonable bounds
in the past, the absence of any well defined standard leaves a serious
lack of predictability for the future.
In addition to the common law crime of conspiracy, there are
several statutes in North Carolina punishing agreements to accomplish
certain crimes.48 At common law a defendant can be convicted of both
the conspiracy and its criminal object, and separately punished for the
two offenses.4 7 Although no North Carolina case has been found on
the point, under these statutes a defendant might also be punished
separately for the conspiracy and the completed object thereof. 48  The
effect of the statutes is only to prescribe the punishment; they do not
merge the conspiracy and the substantive offense.49
The crime of conspiracy has been stretched by judges "to the limit
of its logic."'5 This is due to the general feeling that a combination of
persons to do an act or to achieve any object may in itself be an evil,
or a social danger, quite apart from the act or object.51 This aspect of
the crime probably acounts for its vague nature, for the degree of
social danger must vary directly with the security of the times. Thus
a combination of persons to oppose a court decision in peaceful times
may present no special danger to society, so long as no act is done.
The same combination may be adjudged criminal if the community is
incensed.52 The cases must therefore be read in the context of the
period of time in which they were rendered.5 3 Some state statutes
declare that there is no criminal conspiracy unless it comes w;¢ithin a
statutory definition.5 Such a statute would seem to be a desirable
step toward predictability.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-42 ,(abduction), -356 (blacklisting employees), -50
(injury by explosives), -89 (train robbery), -9 (rebellion) (1953).
"See State v. Bennett, 237 N.C. 749, 76 S.E.2d 42 (1953).
"See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961). In its early stages,
when it was confined to agreements for abuse of process, the crime was incom-
plete unless an indictment was procured. But in the famous Poulterers' Case,
9 Co. 55b, 77 Eng. Rep. 813 (Star Chamber 1611), it was held that the agree-
ment was punishable, even though its object remained unexecuted.
"The problems of cumulative punishment generally are discussed in text at
note 59.
11 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949) (concurring opinion).
"See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
"See, e.g., State v. Cole, 249 N.C. 733, 107 S.E.2d 732 (1959) (inciting to
riot).
" Compare State v. Van Pelt, 136 N.C. 633, 49 S.E. 177 (1904), Teith State
v. Dalton, 168 N.C. 204, 83 S.E. 693 (1914).
" See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CoDE § 183; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 582.
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Another theory treats conspiracy in accord with the same general
principles whereby an attempt is held criminal. 5 When a person has
taken steps which put the crime sufficiently close to commission, at the
point where conduct advances beyond "mere" preparation to the stage
of attempt, he is criminally punishable though the intended crime is
uncommitted. The rationale of punishing this unexecuted intent is
said to be that the acts bear criminal intent upon their face and when
the point of attempt is reached there is less likelihood that the defendant
will forego its completion; the state is therefore justified in stepping
in at that point. Similarly, when one person agrees with another to
commit a criminal act, the likelihood of actual commission is increased.
He receives strength of purpose from the combination. There also
seems to be greater danger to society by virtue of the increased effi-
ciency obtainable from numbers. Further, like the overt act in the
law of attempt, the agreement bears within itself the evidence of criminal
intent. However, the vital distinction between attempt and conspiracy
should not be overlooked. No overt act is necessary to a common law
conspiracy, unless the agreement itself is deemed an "act," while an
overt "step" toward commission of the crime is the very crux of an
attempt. Indeed, a defendant may be convicted in the same trial of
both a conspiracy to commit a certain crime and its attempt.q.6
ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME
Agreement
The criminal act in conspiracy is the agreement; nothing further
need be accomplished. 57 But there are two dimensions to every agree-
ment, namely, the parties to the agreement and the object thereof. The
indictment must allege both.58 The nature of the object dimension
having been previously discussed, there remains the exploration of
the requisites of the party dimension and the plurality of objects in
determining the number of existing conspiracies.
Since the gist of the crime is the agreement, each time a new act is
incorporated, or a change in members is effected, it is theoretically pos-
sible to find a new conspiracy. It could be said that each member
commits another crime by agreement with a new member to accom-
plish the sane act, or by agreement with the old members to accomplish
a new act. It seems clear, however, that such is not the crime of con-
See Developments-Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. Ray. 920, 924 (1959).
State v. Caldwell, 249 N.C. 56, 105 S.E2d 189 (1958) (bombing). There
could probably be no conviction for conspiracy to attempt a crime because the
thing agreed to would be the crime itself. There seems to be no reason, how-
ever, why one could not attempt to conspire-make an offer to conspire which
is rejected or of which the intended receiver is not cognizant.
n State v. Caldwell, 249 N.C. 56, 105 S.E.2d 189 (1958); State v. Ritter, 197
N.C. 113, 147 S.E. 733 (1929).
" The sufficiency of the allegations in these respects is discussed in text at
note 151.
[Vol. 39
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spiracy. For example, A and B agree to rob C and D. Are they
guilty of two conspiracies or only one? "The gist of the offense is the
conspiracy and it is single, though its object is to commit a number of
crimes." 19 Even though the indictment sets out the conspiracy in two
separate counts, it is nevertheless single."° This result is manifestly cor-
rect, for to find multiple crimes would in many cases result in unreason-
able punishment for a comparatively innocent act.61 If, however, the
agreement to rob D is made after the robbery of C, it seems consistent
with the rationale of the crime to punish for the two distinct agree-
ments.
62
If E should enter into the conspiracy after its formation, there re-
mains but one conspiracy, and each of the three are responsible, at
least evidentially, for the actions of the others.63 But suppose A, B,
and E agree to rob C and D. Then B and E, in the absence of A,
decide to rob only D and carry out the plan as modified. A's responsi-
bility is in no way affected by the modification of the agreement. He
may be liable not only for the conspiracy but also for the accomplished
robbery.
64
The agreement must contemplate that each of the parties will fur-
ther the unlawful purpose; thus there can be no conspiracy to do an
act which is already accomplished. 65 It is not necessary, however, that
the parties expressly state the agreement. A mutual, implied under-
standing is sufficient, though no word is said.66 Neither is it necessary
that each party to the conspiracy be personally acquainted with the
other members; if there is one member, or several, who act as unifying
agents, there is a single conspiracy.6 7
In State v. Smith68 it was held that a single conspiracy may exist
even though all but one of the defendants were ignorant of the existence
of more than one other conspirator. There the charge was conspiracy
to bribe, against Smith ind four different police officers. It was held
that all defendants were parties to the same conspiracy, although each
"Dowdy v. United States, 46 F2d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 1931).
60 State v. Gibson. 233 N.C. 691, 65 S.E.2d 508 (1951). See also State v.
Smith, 237 N.C. 1, 74 S.E.2d 291 (1953)."See, e.g., State v. Davenport, 227 N.C. 475, 42 S.E.2d 686 (1947), where
the agreement was to swindle literally thousands of investors.
"The crime of conspiracy punishes the combination because of its danger to
society, quite apart from the prevention of the specific crime. Thus, in this light,
the combination is no more dangerous when it contemplates numerous crimes
than when its object is single. But after the crime is consummated, there is
a legitimate interest in preventing a re-forming of the groul See Callanan v.
United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961).
"State v. Turner, 119 N.C. 841, 25 S.E. 810 (1896).
" State v. Summerlin, 232 N.C. 333, 60 S.E.2d 322 (1950). For discussion
of the liability of co-conspirators for substantive offenses, see text at note 212.
" State v. Phillips, 240 N.C. 516, 82 S.E.2d 762 (1954).
"State v. Connor, 179 N.C. 752, 103 S.E. 79 (1920).
"State v. Davenport, 227 N.C. 475, 42 S.E.2d 686 (1947).
11237 N.C. 1, 74 S.E.2d 291 (1953).
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officer was unaware of Smith's agreement with their fellow officers.
In support of this proposition, the court cited cases holding that an
agreement may be implied from acts of the parties. It is arguable that
these cases should not be applicable. It seems proper to find a single
conspiracy when all defendants are aware that a number of persons are
included but are not personally acquainted with them. In such a case
the defendant may be deemed to assume the risk of his personally
unknown accomplices' action. But when a defendant agrees with one
known to him, it seems unreasonable to hold that he can conspire with
another, the existence of whom he was unaware. In this type of case,
it seems more reasonable to find multiple conspiracies.6 9
The decision in Smith avoids rendering certain the North Carolina
position on the proposition that two parties cannot be convicted of a
conspiracy to commit a crime when the crime is of such a nature as
to necessarily require the participation of two persons. This is the
general rule elsewhere,"0 but no North Carolina case has been found
in which it was so held. Had the court in the Smith case found four
separate agreements, it would not have been possible under the general
rule to convict any of the defendants of conspiracy. But if the agree-
ment is between more persons than are actually necessary to commit
the offense, it is generally held that all parties to the agreement may
be guilty of conspiracy.
71
A party may be convicted of conspiracy to commit a crime which
individually he could not commit. Thus in State v. Davis72 the de-
fendants were charged with conspiracy to violate statutory provisions
against misapplication by bank officers of banking funds. One defend-
ant was not an officer and thus could not commit the offense. He was
nevertheless found guilty of conspiracy. The court said it is not neces-
sary that all of the conspirators be capable of executing the conspiracy
if one or more of them is able to do so.
It is obvious that in order to have an agreement, there must be a
concurrence of at least two parties. If the indictment alleges a con-
spiracy by only two defendants and one is acquitted, the other must
go free.73 Although it is not necessary that both conspirators be tried
at the same time, a subsequent acquittal of the only other alleged party
will require a release of a previously convicted. conspirator.74 This
" In the Smith case there was some evidence that at least one officer knew of
the crimes of the others. But the court did not proceed upon that basis.
70 1 WHArTON, CaimnxAL LAW AND PROCEDRE 191 (Anderson ed. 1957).
71 State v. Clemenson, 123 Iowa 524, 99 N.W. 139 (1904). Cf. State v. Wil-
son, 121 N.C. 650, 28 S.E. 416 (1897), where a conspiracy between A and B to
persuade two girls to submit to sham marriages for the purpose of seducing them
was held indictable.
72203 N.C. 13, 164 S.E. 737 (1932).





problem is solved by an indictment charging a conspiracy between the
defendant and parties unknown or parties not prosecuted.7 5 On the
other hand, the defendant may nevertheless be convicted, though his
co-conspirator has died before prosecution."6
In State v. Gardner77 it was held that the jury could find only one
defendant guilty, on the theory that the indictment mentioned another,
not on trial nor indicted, who could have been part of the conspiracy.
When the indictment charges that persons other than those on trial
were included in the conspiracy, it is obviously error for the judge to
charge that two must be convicted or none at all. But whether the
error is prejudicial to the convicted defendant is a question upon which
there is some confusion in the North Carolina decisions. In. State v.
Diggs78 the court answer.ed the question in the affirmative. The theory
of the court was apparently that the jury might convict one about whose
guilt there was a reasonable doubt in order to avoid an acquittal of the
guilty party. But in three subsequent cases, an instruction to like effect
was held not to be prejudicial to defendants. 79 It seems that the reason-
ing of the Diggs case is sound.
Because of the requirement of an agreement between two independ-
ent minds, some jurisdictions have held that a wife could not be guilty
of a conspiracy with her husband, unless there was also a third party
involved.80 An early North Carolina case said in a dictum: "A husband
and wife cannot be indicted for (conspiracy) . . . because, in law, they
are but one person."8' A number of jurisdictions, however, have held
that the unity of husband and wife has been destroyed by the Married
Women's Acts; thus the husband and wife alone may be guilty of con-
spiracy. 2 North Carolina has not decided the question.83
' State v. Caldwell, 249 N.C. 56, 105 S.E.2d 189 (1958) ; State v. Abernethy,
220 N.C. 226, 17 S.E.2d 25 (1941).78 State v. Aldridge, 206 N.C. 850, 175 S.E. 191 (1934).
784 N.C. 732 (1881)."8181 N.C. 550, 106 S.E. 834 (1921).
71 State v. Lippard, 223 N.C. 167, 25 S.E.2d 594 (1943); State v. Anderson,
208 N.C. 771, 182 S.E. 643 (1935). In State v. Caldwell, 249 N.C. 56, 105 S.E2d
189 (1958), it was said that the charge was "more favorable than defendants were
entitled to." Id. at 59, 105 S.E.2d at 192. The theory of these cases is apparently
that the jury would be more disposed to convict one defendant than it would be
to convict two.
'0See Annot., Effect of Coverture Upon the Criminal Responsibility of a
Woman, 71 A.L.R. 1116 (1930).8' State v. Christianbury, 44 N.C. 46, 48 (1852).
82E.g., State v. Martin, 4 Ill. 2d 105, 122 N.E.2d 245 (1954). But as shown
in an annotation to the Martin case, Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1275 (1954), the
American opinion is by no means unanimous.
8 But see State v. Phillips, 240 N.C. 516, 82 S.E.2d 762 (1954), where the hus-
band and wife were convicted in the lower court. This judgment was reversed
on appeal because of the insufficiency of evidence. The court expressly declined
to rule on whether or not the husband and wife alone could commit a con-
spiracy.
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A number of legal writers have concluded that the requirement of
an agreement has been so diluted in American jurisdictions that it is
no longer an effective prerequisite. 84 In this connection however, it
should be noticed that the necessity of agreement may arise in two
essentially different contexts. The first is wheft an indictment charges
the crime of conspiracy. Here the necessity of an agreement is abso-
lute for the very essence of the charge is an agreement. The only
difficulty encountered is in the quantum of proof necessary to establish
it.85 - Secondly, an indictment may charge multiple defendants with the
same substantive offense (not conspiracy). In this context the state
may seek to sustain the admission of evidence, as for example under
the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, or to hold one de-
fendant vicariously liable for the actions of another,86 upon the theory
that there was an agreement (conspiracy) to accomplish some unlaw-
ful end.
In this second situation, there is some understandable meshing of
the law of parties with the law of conspiracy. Thus in State v. Knotts8"
four defendants were indicted for an assault with pistols. The evidence
showed that one Stamey "had nothing to do with the shooting. Just
standing there." The court stated that it was conclusively shown that
he was there for the purpose of aiding and abetting his comrades. But
there was also evidence of a conspiracy to rob. In supporting his con-
viction as a principal by finding a conspiracy the court observed that:
"If he concurs, no proof of agreement to concur is necessary. As soon
as the union of wills for the unlawful purpose is perfected, the offense
of conspiracy is complete."8 8 It may be inferred from this statement
that even if the assault defendants had not known of the existence of
Stamey, he could have been guilty of conspiracy, i.e., by "concurring"
in the assault. But to have a "union of wills" it is necessary to have
at least a tacit "agreement" between the parties. Thus the quotation
is self contradictory unless it is read only to mean that no express
verbal agreement is required. That is not to say that no agreement at
all need be proved.
Suppose, for example, that A is engaged in stealing from C. B
happens along and, seeing A drop an item, picks it up and hands it
to him, having no l6ve for C. It seems clear that B is guilty as an
aider and abettor. Are A and B also guilty of a conspiracy to steal
from C? If so, then it is difficult to conceive a crime by multiple
" See AREes, Conspiracy Revisited, 3 BmrvAto L. Rev. 242 (1954); Note,
Agreement as an Element in Conspiracy, 23 VA. L. REv. 898 (1937).
" See State v. Phillips, 240 N.C. 516, 82 S.E.2d 762 (1954) ; State v. Well-
born, 229 N.C. 617, 50 S.E.2d 720 (1948). And see text at note 161.
80 See text at note 212.
87168 N.C. 173, 83 S.E. 972 (1914).
Id. at 188, 83 S.E. at 979.
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parties wherein the additional punishment for conspiracy could not be
imposed. On the other hand, in State v, Kendall" the court summarily
dismissed an objection that there was no evidence of an agreement
(conspiracy) with the statement that "one was present aiding and
abetting the other." Thus it appears that irk practice A and B in the
hypothetical could be found guilty of a conspiracy. This follows from
the conclusive weight given, to the fact of aiding and abetting. Since
no agreement need be shown for aiding and abetting, then, it may be
said that the same is true for conspiracy.
Although this analysis is perhaps logically defensible, it does not
give a true picture of conspiracy. These statements by the court must
be put into their proper setting. In these cases, since the indictment
is for a "substantive" crime, the defendant may, at least arguably, be
guilty as charged if he is either an aider and abettor or a conspirator.
The remarks as to conspiracy are thus in support of the finding that de-
fendant is a co-principal and not the basis for it.91 This concept of the
crime has fortunately not been carried over to cases wherein the
indictment separately charges the crime of conspiracy, so that in that
situation at least an agreement before the perpetration of the crime is
still a requirement for conspiracy.92
As noted, when only two are charged with conspiracy and one is
acquitted, the other must be released.93 From this it necessarily follows
that if one is only pretending to agree, there has been no conspiracy
regardless of the criminal intent of the other. But if there are three
parties to the agreement, there may be a conspiracy between the re-
maining two, even though one of the three is innocent.9 4 It has been
seen that in North Carolina it is unnecessary for a defendant to know
that there is a third party to the agreement in order for him to be
guilty as a co-conspirator with such third party.95 Suppose B,, an offi-
89 143 N.C. 659, 663, 57 S.E. 340, 342 (1907).
8' Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 11 (1954). See also Nye & Nissen v.
United States, 336 U.S. 613 (1949). "An aider and abettor is one who advises,
counsels, procures, or encourages another to commit a crime." State v. Ham, 238
N.C. 94, 97, 76 S.E2d 346, 348 (1953). But he must be constructively present at
the time and place of the commission of the offense. See State v. Hart, 186 N.C.
582, 120 S.E. 345 (1923).
91 See, e.g., State v. Connor, 179 N.C. 752, 103 S.E. 79 (1920), where it is
said that if the defendants were at the scene of the murder by preconcert and were
aiding, they were guilty as principals.905ee, e.g., State v. Phillips, 240 N.C. 516, 82 S.E.2d 762 (1954). Thus, in
the situation supposed, A had already committed larceny. B's role was only
that of an approving bystander until he volunteered assistance after the crime
was consummated.
'8 State v. Tom, 13 N.C. 569 (1828).
" State v. Walker, 251 N.C. 465, 112 S.E2d 61 (1960); State v. Caldwell,
249 N.C. 56, 105 S.E2d 189 (1958).
"See State v. Smith, 237 N.C. 1, 74 S.E.2d 291 (1953) ; accord, Coates v.
United States, 59 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1932). But see United States v. Falcone, 311
U.S. 205 (1940).
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cer, pretends to agree with A to commit a crime and independently
with C to commit the same offense. Neither A nor C know of B's
pretended agreement with the other. Are A and C co-conspirators?
It seems clear that they should not be. But if A and C separately
agree with B that he is to enlist the aid of some other person, then
even though B was pretending, the conviction of A and C may be
justified upon an agency theory. When A agrees with B, he agrees
also with C who is represented by B.
Intent
It has been said that "criminal conspiracy involves a specific intent
to commit a particular act, the perpetration of which the state desires
to forestall." 98 The intent, with reference to the "act" of agreement is
indeed "specific." The parties must knowingly and consciously agree.
But if the quoted statement is taken to refer to the intent to bring
about a specific crime, apart from the agreement, its accuracy may be
legitimately questioned. 97 The problem here discussed is closely re-
lated to the question of whether or not the object of the conspiracy must
be criminal. If that question is answered in the affirmative, then the
quoted statement seems unimpeachable, i.e., the intent must be to per-
petrate the commission of a specific crime.
But, as discussed earlier, there is considerable uncertainty as to
the requisite nature of the act contemplated. It should be noted that
conspiracy may differ from other crimes in that there need be no intent
to do a criminal act; as related to other crimes and the intent required,
the "specific intent" requirement in conspiracy is misleading. Similarly,
it seems fruitless to speculate whether or not the parties must know
that the contemplated act is "unlawful."
9 8
It is clear that the defendant need not intend the very act in fact
accomplished by the group, at least for the purpose of holding him
vicariously liable for some substantive offense.99 But he must intend
to bring about the act which is the object of the conspiracy charged.
Thus in State v. Trammell'0 the defendants were charged with con-
spiring to defraud certain citizens of their lands. The evidence showed
that the citizens did not in fact own the land, because they had not
registered in the land books pursuant to the homestead acts, but that
the defendants had agreed to fraudulently enter their own names before
the land office opened and deprived others of the opportunity to claim
" HARNO, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. Ray. 624, 635 (1941).
(Emphasis added.)
97 See Aruxs, supra note 84, at 250.
"There is authority elsewhere that the parties must have such knowledge.
See, e.g., Landen v. United States, 299 Fed. 75 (6th Cir. 1924).
' State v. Finley, 118 N.C. 1162, 24 S.E. 495 (1896).1024 N.C. 379 (1842).
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their chosen. lands. The court held: "[T]he charge of conspiracy
should clearly set forth the purpose and object of the combination, as
in these are to be found almost the only marks of certainty by which
the parties accused may known [sic] what is the accusation which they
are to defend."' 01-
In State v. Batts1 2 the indictment charged a conspiracy to wreck
an automobile- with the intent to defraud an insurance company. The
court held evidence of other damage inflicted by defendant upon his
automobile admissible over objection. The court said: "One of the
elements of the offense with which the defendant was charged was the
intent. In such cases it is well established that evidence of other like
offenses is competent."'1 3 Thus a group may wreck an automobile,
and each thereby intend to defraud. But the conspiracy was complete
before the automobile was wrecked. It consisted of an agreement be-
tween the parties to wreck the automobile. In this light, the "element"
of intent does not refer to the intent to agree but to the intent to wreck
an automobile in order to defraud. In proving the agreement, how-
ever, the fact that one of the defendants had previously wrecked his
car has no logical competence.
Once an agreement is shown, it is then incumbent upon the State
to show that the object of the agreement was unlawful. Wrecking a
car is, in this context, only unlawful if it is done with the intent to
defraud. The proof should then take the following form: (1) A and
B agreed to wreck A's car. (2) The ageement was for the purpose
of defrauding the insurance company. If all of the evidence in the
case is relevant only to the purpose of the agreement, then the "crime
charged" has not been proved."0 4
Significance of the Overt Act
Although at common law, and in North Carolina, the crime of
conspiracy is complete as soon as the agreement is made, some juris-
dictions 0 5 require the commission of an overt act in furtherance 6 of
the agreement. In these jurisdictions, however, the overt act may be
that of a single conspirator, 10 and his act is sufficient to convict all
parties to the agreement. The purpose of the overt act requirement
101 Id. at 386.
102210 N.C. 659, 188 S.E. 99 (1936).
102 Id. at 660, 188 S.E. at 100.
.0. See State v. McCullough, 244 N.C. 11, 92 S.E.2d 389 (1956).
105 See, e.g., People v. Buffum, 40 Cal. 2d 709, 256 P2d 317 (1953); State
v. Townley, 149 Minn. 5, 182 N.W. 773 (1921), cert denied, 257 U.S. 643 (1922) ;
People v. Flack, 125 N.Y. 324, 26 N.E. 267 (1891). See also ARic. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-1201 (1947) ("conspire to commit . . .and make some advance thereto");
and the federal general conspiracy law, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1958).
100 Williams v. United States, 271 F.2d 703 (4th Cir. 1959).
'"7Braverman v. United States. 317 U.S. 49 (1942).
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is to permit the parties to withdraw from the combination before the
unlawful: act is committed.'08
It might be assumed that, since there is no overt act requirement in
North Carolina, the commission of an overt act is irrelevant to a
charge of conspiracy. This is not always the case. When an agree-
ment is formed outside of the state, the North Carolina courts have no
jurisdiction unless there has been an overt act within the state."0 " But
when one of the conspirators performs an overt act within the state "in
legal contemplation, a criminal conspiracy is continued and renewed as
to all its members wherever and whenever any member of the con-
spiracy acts in furtherance of the common design."" 0 On the other
hand when an agreement entered into in North Carolina does not con-
template any overt act within the state, conviction will be sustained,"1
and the venue is in the county in which the agreement was made.112
The overt act of one conspirator is also admissible in evidence against
the other in North Carolina. 113
DEFENSES
Statute of Limitations
There is no statute of limitations for felonies in North Carolina.
The application of the statute, therefore, depends in the first instance
upon the classification of the conspiracy. At the common law, all con-
spiracies were misdemeanors, even though their object was the commis-
sion of a felony. 1 4 In North Carolina, however, conspiracies to com-
mit misdemeanors are misdemeanors, and conspiracies to commit
felonies are felonies."1
5
The North Carolina statute of limitations'" provides that indict-
ment "shall be presented or found by the grand jury within two years
after the commission of the . .. [misdemeanor], and not aftenvards."
The statute applies to "all misdemeanors except malicious misdemean-
ors." It has been stated that this statute does not apply to conspir-
acies.". 7 This is probably asserted upon the assumption that conspiracies
are either "felonies" or they are "malicious." Since a conspiracy
may be a misdemeanor, the question arises as to whether all conspir-
acies which are misdemeanors are "malicious misdemeanors," and thus
outside the pale of the statute.
" United States v. Belisle, 107 F. Supp. 283 (D.C. Wash. 1951).
1.9 Dowdy v. United States, 46 F.2d 417 (4th Cir. 1931).
110 State v. Hicks, 233 N.C. 511, 517, 64 S.E.2d 871, 876 (1951).
... Ibid. (dictum). See Note, 1 OsGooDr HAL L.S.J. 76 (1958).
11. State v. Davis, 203 N.C. 13, 164 S.E. 737 (1932).
113 See text at note 179.
' State v. Jackson, 82 N.C. 565 (1880).
.. This conclusion is reached through an integration of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
1 (1953) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-3 (1953).
N.C. GEi. STAT. § 15-1 (1953).
... Developments-Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. Rlv. 920, 960 and n.287 (1959).
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The court has ruled118 that only those misdemeanors having
malice as an element of the offense are malicious misdemeanors within
the meaning of our statute of limitations. There is no requirement in
the law that the parties to a conspiracy must "maliciously" agree;
furthermore, in many cases the offense which is the object of the con-
spiracy will not have malice as an essential element. Consequently, if
the misdemeanor conspiracy still must contain the element of malice
in order to be outside the statute,"19 many misdemeanor conspiracies
would seem to come within the statute.
Assuming that conspiracies to accomplish non-malicious misdemean-
ors must be prosecuted within two years, the question arises as to
when the statute will begin to run. Since the crime is complete upon
agreement, it may be thought that the two year period commences
with the agreement. But conspiracy is a continuing offense. It is
renewed with each overt act, and the danger to society remains as
long as the agreement continues. Thus it has been held that the point
of termination of the agreement, whether by abandonment or achieve-
ment of the object, starts the running of the statute. 12°
Former Jeopardy
It has been noted that the conspiracy indictment affords great op-
portunity for abuse in that separate indictments may be brought and
cumulative punishment inflicted for each conspiracy. The limits of
the crime are vague enough to permit a finding of separate conspiracies
each time a new object is incorporated'12 or a new party added. For
purposes of cumulative punishment, whether upon separate trials or
separate counts in the indictment, the defendant is interested in show-
ing that there was only one conspiracy with multiple parties and ob-
jects. The latter observation applies equally to the defense of former
jeopardy.
The test for the application of the double jeopardy doctrine is
stated by Justice Ervin, in State v. Hicks,'2 2 to be, "Whether the
facts alleged in the second [indictment], if given in evidence, would
"'State v. Frisbee, 142 N.C. 671, 55 S.E. 722 (1906). See also State v.
Claywell, 98 N.C. 731, 3 S.E. 920 (1887).
"' In State v. Frisbie, supra note 118, at 675, 55 S.E. at 724, the court said
that the legislature "evidently intended to describe offenses of which malice is a
necessary ingredient to constitute the criminal act, as in the case of malicious
mischief." This interpretation followed, according to the court, from the use of
the phrase "other malicious misdemeanors" immediately after the phrase "mali-
cious mischief" in the statute. In 1943 the statute was rewritten, weakening this
argument by inserting the provision for petit larceny between the two uses of
"malicious"
120 United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601 (1910). But cf. Lowell v. People,
131 Ill. App. 137, 140, rev'd on other grounds, 229 Ill. 227, 82 N.E. 226 (1907).
See generally Note, 56 CoLuM. L. Ray. 1216 (1956).
"'1 But cf. State v. Gibson, 233 N.C. 691, 65 S.E.2d 508 (1951).
122233 N.C. 511, 516, 64 S.E. 2d 871, 875 (1951).
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have sustained a conviction under the first indictment ... or whether
the same evidence would support a conviction in each case." In the
first Hicks trial the indictment charged that defendant conspired to
injure the property of X. The proof was that he conspired to injure
the property of Y. The conviction was reversed for variance.' 23 The
second action for conspiracy to injure the property of Y was not
barred, because evidence of a conspiracy to injure Y's property would
not have supported a conviction for conspiracy to injure X's prop-
erty.
124
It is apparent from the "same evidence" test that a former trial
for the substantive offense conspired to will not bar a subsequent
prosecution for conspiracy to commit the offense. 2 5 The essential ele-
ment in the later trial for conspiracy is the agreement. That element
is not raised at the former trial. Should an acquittal on a charge of
conspiracy to commit an offense bar a subsequent prosecution for the
substantive offense? It seems clear that it should not. Proof of an
overt act on the former trial is wholly unnecessary, and since the con-
spiracy does not merge12 6 with the completed offense, it would seem
that evidence proving the substantive offense would not support a
conviction of conspiracy.
But suppose a defendant was tried for conspiracy to burglarize
and for burglary of A's house and was acquitted. A was killed in the
course of the alleged burglary. May the defendant later be convicted
of the murder of A upon the theory that by furnishing transportation
to and from A's house he had participated in the murder? In State v.
Bell' 27 it was held that double jeopardy could successfully be pleaded
as a bar to the subsequent prosecution. The court noted that the evi-
dence in this second trial showed a conspiracy to "rob" A but not a
conspiracy to murder. Thus, since the defendant would be guilty of
all crimes committed in furtherance of the- conspiracy to rob, "the
facts required to convict him on the second indictment would neces-
sarily have convicted him on the first."' 28 That is, proof of the agree-
ment to burglarize would render the defendant guilty of both the
burglary and the murder.
The second indictment in the Bell case charged a conspiracy to
murder; yet the proof showed a conspiracy to burglarize. Thus for
1223233 N.C. 31, 62 S.E2d 497 (1950).
is& For an early holding to the same effect see The King v. Vandercomb, 2
Leach Cr. Gas. 708, 720, 168 Eng. Rep. 455, 461 (1796).State v. Lippard, 223 N.C. 167, 25 S.E.2d 594 (1943).
128 See, e.g., State v. Caldwell, 249 N.C. 56, 105 S.E.2d 189 (1958) ; State v.
Gibson, 233 N.C. 691, 65 S.E2d 508 (1951); State v. Dale, 218 N.C. 625, 12
S.E.2d 556 (1940) ; State v. Shipman, 202 N.C. 518, 163 S.E. 657 (1932).
121205 N.C. 225, 171 S.E. 50 (1933).
... Id. at 227, 171 S.E. at 51.
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practical purposes, the case is the same as if the defendant initially had
been tried for conspiracy to burglarize and then for murder. In this
light, his guilt in both trials depended upon evidence of an agreement
to burglarize, because it was shown that he did not actually participate
in the entry. His liability for murder would have been wholly vicarious.
The main issue, the agreement, had therefore been litigated in the
former trial. The result seems entirely sound.
INCONSISTENCY
The conspiracy indictment usually charges that at least two named
defendants have agreed, but the indictment need only charge that "de-
fendant conspired with others."' 29 As was noted previously, there must
exist at least one other party who could have agreed and who has not
been acquitted of the crime.' 30 It is immaterial that the only other party
implicated is dead at the time of trial.' 3 ' But having implicated only
two parties, may the state take a nolle prosequi as to one and yet ac-
quire a conviction of the other? There is authority both ways. Some
courts view the nol pros as the equivalent of an acquittal.' 32 Others
hold that it has no effect upon the conviction of the co-conspirator. 33
Recent writers disagree as to which is the majority opinion.' 3 4
North Carolina, so far as the writer has discovered, has never had
a case presented in which the State took a nolle prosequi as to all but
one of the implicated parties. In State v. Davenport'3 all of the parties
except the defendant who were both charged and living were nol
prossed. But the court sustained the conviction of the one remaining
upon the theory that the evidence implicated another party who was
charged but who had died before the trial. The court expressly refused
to determine the effect of the nolle prosequi.'36 Since a nol pros merely
represents an election on the part of the State not to pursue the case
further, and in view of the vagueness permitted in describing the co-
conspirator, it seems that North Carolina would follow those jurisdic-
tions holding the nol pros has no effect upon the conviction of the
co-conspirator.
Another question of consistency is presented by the statement that
129 State v. Lewis, 142 N.C. 626, 55 S.E. 600 (1906).
130 State v. Raper, 204 N.C. 503, 168 S.E. 831 (1933); State v. Tom, 13 N.C.
569 (1828).
231 State v Turner, 119 N.C. 841, 25 S.E. 810 (1896).
"' Stafr ,. Jackson, 7 S.C. 283 (1876); Miller v. United States, 277 Fed.
721, 726 (4th Cir. 1921) (dictum).
133E.g., United States v. Fox, 130 F.2d 56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 666
(1942).
"' Compare Developments-Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REv. 920, 973 (1958),
with 1 WHARTON, CRImINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 201 (Anderson ed. 1957).
"'227 N.C. 475, 42 S.E.2d 686 (1947).
""In State v. Turner, 119 N.C. 841, 25 S.E. 810 (1896), two defendants
were nol prossed, but it does not appear how many were charged.
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a conspirator is liable for all substantive crimes committed by his co-
conspirators in furtherance of the common design. "The least degree of
consent or collusion between the parties to an illegal transaction makes
the act of one of them the act of the other. ' 137 Upon this theory, it
was held that two defendants charged with murder are not entitled to
an instruction to the effect that if it was impossible to determine which
one did the killing, both should be found not guilty.188 It should fol-
low that one conspirator could not be found guilty of both conspiracy
and the objective crime, while the other is found guilty of conspiracy
only. If, indeed, the acts of one in pursuance of the conspiracy are
automatically the acts of the other, a finding that only one is guilty of
the offense conspired to while both are guilty of conspiracy is logically
impossible. Yet in State v. Shipman'3  the jury returned such a verdict
and the court affirmed without discussion of the apparent inconsistency.
CONSOLIDATED PROSECUTIONS
Since conspiracy is necessarily a multi-party crime, it generally af-
fords the prosecutor the advantages of the joint trial. 140 For example,
in the joint trial the number of peremptory challenges of jurors granted
a defendant may be cut;14 the large number of defendants, and the
complexity and mass of the evidence, may confuse the jury to the
detriment of an individual.' 42 The jury may have difficulty in differen-
tiating among defendants and may tend to infer the guilt of one merely
because he is tried with the others.143 The effectiveness of defense
counsel may be impaired by the presence of many lawyers and defend-
ants, and if fewer counsel are retained, the possibility of detriment by
association is heightened. 144
Since these disadvantages arise from the joint trial, and not from
the nature of the conspiracy, a logical solution is to seek a severance.
However, in North Carolina the denial of severance is reviewable only
upon abuse of discretion. 45 With the court dockets continually over-
crowded, severance is seldom used.
187 State v. Anderson, 92 N.C. 733, 747 (1885).
l'8 State v. Finley, 118 N.C. 1162, 24 S.E. 495 (1896).
189202 N.C. 518, 163 S.E. 657 (1932).
"'See Note, 68 HAv. L. REv. 1046 (1955).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-163 (1953) permits each defendant to have his un-
diminished number. Cf. GA. CODE § 59.805 (1933) (twenty challenges for each
defendant) ; N.Y. CODE CIM. PRoc. §§ 360, 373 (five challenges exercisable only
jointly).
... See, e.g., State v. Walker, 251 N.C. 465, 112 S.E2d 61, cert. denied, 364
U.S. 832 (1960) (eight defendants) ; State v. Diggs, 181 N.C. 550, 106 S.E. 834
(1921) (fourteen defendants).
148 See O'BRIAN, Loyalty Tests mid Guilt by Association, 61 HARV. L. REy.
592, 602 (1948).
144 See O'DouGHERTY, Prosecution and Defense Under Conspiracy Indictments,




Because of the vague nature of conspiracy, and the clandestine man-
ner in which it is committed, the requirements of stating the crime in
the indictment are less stringent than in other prosecutions. In the
ordinary indictment, when two or more offenses are charged in the
same count, the indictment is faulty because of duplicity.146 But "in
conspiracy cases the court will never be keen to hold an indictment bad
for duplicity."'147 Consequently, the conspiracy and the crime which is
its object may be laid in the same count.148 In such a case the defend-
ant, before verdict, may require the State to elect. But after the verdict
is returned and the jury is discharged, it is too late to complain.149 Sim-
ilarly, an indictment which charged conspiracy to run a horse lottery in
one count, and conspiracy -to operate a butter and egg lottery in another,
has been held to charge the same crime. Since the two counts were
only different ways of stating the crime, the indictment was neither
duplicitous nor multifarious.150
As in any other crime, however, the indictment must set out facts
showing all the elements of the offense; and the injured parties must
be identified, although not necessarily by name. It has been held that
an indictment charging a conspiracy to rape certain females "to the
jurors unknown" did not adequately lay the charge.151 - Proof of a con-
spiracy to dynamite A's property will not support a charge of con-
spiracy to dynamite the property of B.152 Similarly, a charge of con-
spiracy to destroy a warrant must set out the substance of the warrant,
or it must state that the warrant was issued and by whom.
1 3
In State v. Dale'54 it was said that when the indictment charges a
conspiracy to commit a crime, "it is unnecessary to describe the crime,
which is the subject of the conspiracy, with legal and technical ac-
curacy." In support of this statement the court cited a Maryland case
and a federal case. North Carolina authority, however, is not lacking,155
but the early cases gave a distinctly different impression. In State v.
Tramnmel15 68 the court observed that a conspiracy is complete even
though no act is done in furtherance of the agreement.
1,8 Ibid.
State v. Dale, 218 N.C. 625, 639, 12 S.E.2d 556, 564 (1940). But cf. dicta
in State v. Lewis, 185 N.C 640, 116 S.E. 259 (1923).
148 Ibid.
14 State v. Dale, 218 N.C. 625, 12 S.E2d 556 (1940).
State v. Gibson, 233 N.C. 691, 65 S.E2d 508 (1951).
State v. Trice, 88 N.C. 628 (1883).
1. State v. Hicks, 233 N.C. 31, 62 S.E2d 497 (1950).
13 State v. Enloe, 20 N.C. 508 (1839).
1s'218 N.C. 625, 641, 12 S.E2d 556, 565 (1940).
2'1 See State v. Abernethy, 220 N.C. 226, 17 S.E.2d 25 (1941) ; State v. Lewis,
185 N.C. 640, 116 S.E. 259 (1923) ;-State v: Howard, 129 N.C. 584, 40 S.E. 71
(1901) ; State v. Brady, 107 N.C. 822, 12 S.E. 325 (1890).
198 24 N.C. 379 (1842).
1961]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
This consideration renders it but the more important that the
charge of conspiracy should clearly set forth the.purpose and
object of the combination, as in these are to be found almost the
only marks of certainty by which the parties accused may known
[sic] what is the accusation which they are to denfend. 15 7
The difference in attitude apparent from these quotations is prob-
ably traceable to the development of the crime itself. When the con-
spiracy indictment was in wide use against agreements to do acts not
in themselves criminal, there was a greater necessity for detailed state-
ment of the acts complained of. A defendant could not adequately
prepare his defense, since the act contemplated need not have been
criminal. This accounts for the statement that "if the criminality of
the offense consists in the agreement to accomplish a purpose not in
itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means, the means
must be set out."'5l s This merely means that the "unlawful" act, -'hether"
end or means, which is contemplated must be charged.
When the act contemplated is criminal, however, a charge simply
that defendant agreed to commit it would seem to be sufficient notice,
without requiring a statement of the method to be used in its perpetra7
tion. The method may be extremely complex, 5 9 and "the modern
tendency is against technical objections which do not affect the merits
of the case."' 60 It has been noted that no reported conviction for con-
spiracy, where the act contemplated was not in itself criminal, has
been obtained since 1914.
EVIDENCE
Circumstantial
The central element which the state must prove in a conspiracy trial
is the agreement, and agreement is necessarily a state of mind.
When resorted to by adroit and crafty persons, the presence
of a common design often becomes exceedingly difficult to
detect.... [Tihe results accomplished, the divergence of those
results from the course which would ordinarily be expected, the
situation of the parties and their antecedent relations to each
other, together with the surrounding circumstances, and the in-
ference legitimately deducible therefrom, furnish, in the absence
of direct proof, and often in the teeth of positive testimony to the
157 Id. at 386.... Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 203 (1893); see State v. Van
Pelt, 136 N.C. 633, 49 S.E. 177 (1904). But see State v. Brady, 107 N.C. 822,
12 S.E. 325 (1890).129 Cf. State v. Davenport, 227 N.C. 475, 42 S.E2d 686 (1947).
""State v. Davis, 203 N.C. 13, 27, 164 S.E. 737, 744 (1932).
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contrary, ample ground for concluding that a conspiracy
exists.' 6 '
Under this broad statement of the rule, it is exceedingly difficult, if
not impossible, to determine that any given set of circumstances is in-
sufficient to permit the jury to infer guilt.
But "when the state relies upon circumstantial evidence for a con-
viction, the circumstances and evidence must be such as to produce in
the minds of the jurors a moral certainty of defendant's guilt, and
exclude any other reasonable hypothesis."'162 This formulation furnishes
no more of a guide than the first. Both statements rather illustrate two
fundamentally conflicting policies in the trial of a defendant for con-
spiracy. That is, in each case the difficulty of proving the agreement
must be balanced against the danger of a conviction upon evidence
sufficient only to "beget suspicion in imaginative minds."'
16 3
In this balancing process, it seems that the quantum of proof re-
quired to sustain a verdict of guilty varies inversely with the severity
of the crime allegedly contemplated. Thus in State v. Powell"3 4 a man
and a woman were indicted for conspiracy to induce an eighteen year
old girl to commit fornication with the male defendant. Conviction
was sustained merely upon testimony that the defendants would engage
in secret conversations, after which the male defendant wotld importune
the girl. Also in State v. Whiteside,165 a conviction of conspiracy to
rob a theatre was sustained upon little more than testimony that the
defendant knew the robber and had asked the State's witness if the
theatre would be a good place to rob.1 66 On the other hand, in State v.
Sinith' 7 officers had learned that a lottery was in operation and that
the tickets were distributed by leaving them in a brown bag in front bf
a church. Officers planted a bag at the appropriate spot, and at one
o'clock a.m. defendant stopped his car just in front of the Church, got
out, and leaned over the bag. He was apprehended before he touched
the bag. Conviction for conspiracy to sell lottery tickets was reversed
for insufficient evidence. 168 The court pointed out that defendant's
... State v. Whiteside, 204 N.C. 710, 712, 169 S.E. 711, 712 (1933).
16. State v. Parker, 234 N.C. 236, 242, 66 S.E2d 907, 912 (1951).
18. State v. Phillips, 240 N.C. 516, 82 S.E.2d 762 (1954).
16,121 N.C. 635, 28 S.E. 525 (1897).
161204 N.C. 710, 169 S.E. 711 (1933).
186 The court observed that "if the defendant has been erroneously convicted,
as he contends, he must attribute it to his evil assoeiations." Id. at 713, 169 S.E.
at 712. See also State v. Beal, 199 N.C. 278, 154 S.E. 604 (1930) (conspiracy
to murder). But ef. State v. Wellborn, 229 N.C. 617, 50 S.E.2d 720 (1948)
(conspiracy to murder, conviction reversed)..61236 N.C. 748, 73 S.E2d 901 (1953).
168 See also the following cases in which the conspiracy conviction was re-
versed for insufficiency of circumstantial evidence: State v. McCullough, 244 N.C.
11, 92 S.E.2d 389 (1956) (illegal transportation of beer) ; State v. Phillips, 240
N.C. 516, 82 S.E.2d 762 (1954) (false pretenses) ; State v. Benson, 234 N.C. 263,
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mission might have been innocent, although the jury had found that
it was not.
Once it is shown that a defendant had knowledge of a conspiracy,
the slightest evidence of participation on his part is sufficient to sustain
his conviction. 169 In State v. Davidsonyt' it was held that "where the
evidence ... shows ... that a loan was made by ... [bank officers]
in violation of the statute, it may reasonably be inferred by the jury
that such... [officers] entered into an agreement to make the loan
before the same was made."'
17
The Davidson case indicates that mere participation in some crimes
may be a sufficient circumstance to infer an agreement. But any such
conclusion as to all crimes is negatived by a subsequent case.172 There
must be some circumstance shown from which the jury can legit-
imately infer a prior agreement. 17 To compensate for the difficulties of
proof faced by tie prosecutor in conspiracy trials, "considerable latitude
is allowed in the reception of evidence offered to establish the gravamen
of the charge or offense."'174
Testimony of a Co-Conspirator
When a number of persons are implicated in the conspiracy, the
task of proving the crime is considerably lightened if one conspirator
is persuaded to be a witness for the State. Accordingly, there are
numerous cases whei'e the prosecutor has either failed to prosecute at
all or taken a nolle prosequi as to one conspirator and used his testi-
mony to cofivict his associates. 75 There can be no objection based upon
the hearsay rule where this testimony relates facts within the knowledge
of the co-conspirator. The witness is on the stand, and may be cross-
examined.' The testimony in such a case is necessarily self-serving,
however, since the witness is himself avoiding punishment by implicat-
ing his associates. In recognition of this some states have statutes re-
quiring corroboration of a co-conspirator's testimony.' 70 In North
Carolina, however, the urisupported testimony of an accomplice is suffi-
66 S.E.2d 893 (1951) (possession of whiskey); State v. Parker, 234 N.C. 236,
66 S.E2d 907 (1951) (possession of whiskey); State v. Wrenn, 198 N.C. 260,
151 S.E. 261 (1930) (defrauding banks).
' "'See State v. Walker, 251 N.C. 465, 112 S.E2d 61, cert. denied, 364 U.S.
832 (1960).
170 205 N.C. 735, 172 S.E. 489 (1934).
2 Id. at 738, 172 S.E. at 490.
'172 State v. Wellborn, 229 N.C. 617, 50 S.E.2d 720 (1948).
1"'See State v. Wrenn, 198 N.C. 260, 151 S.E. 261 (1930).
'State v. Gibson, 233 N.C. 691, 697, 65 S.E.2d 508, 512 (1951).
'7'E.g., State v. Kirkman, 252 N.C 781, 114 S.E.2d 633 (1960) ; State v.
Wells, 219 N.C. 354, 13 S.E2d 613 (1941); State v. Anderson, 208 N.C. 771,
182 S.E. 643 (1935); State v. Ritter, 199 N.C. 116, 154 S.E. 62 (1930); State
v. Turner, 119 N.C. 841, 25 S.E. 810 (1896).""' See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1111; N.Y. COGDE Ca1M. PRoc. § 399.
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cient to sustain a convictionY.-7 When defendants complain that they
have been convicted entirely upon the evidence given by their alleged
accomplices, they are told, "it should be remembered the defendants
were the first to respose confidence in these witnesses, and their appeal
was to- the jury.' ' s7 8 This answer seems a classical example of as-
suming the conclusion, i.e., the defendants are contending that they "re-
posed" no "confidence" in the witnesses-that they are not guilty of
conspiring with them.
The Hearsay Exception
The hearsay exception is readily stated:
[W]hen a conspiracy had been sufficiently established or shown,
then the acts and declarations of each conspirator done or ut-
tered in furtherance of such unlawful purpose are admissible in
evidence against allY7
It is now well established'80 that this rule operates to admit hearsay
declarations of one conspirator against his associates, although the al-
leged declarant is not on trial.'
8 '
This orthodox statement of the rule treats the acts, as well as de-
clarations, of a conspirator as though they are admissible solely because
they come within the exception to the hearsay rule. Such treatment
has led to some confusion in the language of the cases. In State v.
Beal'8 2 the flight of one conspirator, after the contemplated crime was
complete, was held admissible against his co-conspirator. Acts done
after the conspiracy has culminated and its object has been achieved are
patently not "in furtherance" of the conspiracy. This apparent conflict
in the statement of the rule, and the results reached by its application,
would be dispelled if it were expressly recognized that acts are not
hearsay, and therefore not dependent upon the exception for their
... State v. Saunders, 245 N.C. 338, 95 S.E.2d 876 (1957); State v. Tilley,
239 N.C. 245, 79 S.E.2d 473 (1954).State v. Anderson, 208 N.C. 771, 787, 182 S.E. 643, 653 (1935).
State v. Summerlin, 232 N.C. 333, 339, 60 S.E.2d 322, 325 (1950)."SO There was some doubt on this point at one time. See State v. Poll, 8
N.C. 442 (1821). "Th rule has never been carried further than this, that when
a common design is proven, the act of one in furtherance of that design is evi-
dence against his associates; it is in some measure the act of all; but the
declarations of one of the parties can be received only against himself." Id. at
446 (dictum). (Emphasis by the court.) This statement was clarified somewhat
in State v. George, 29 N.C. 321 (1847). There it was said that the declarations
would be admissible only if they could be viewed as acts, within the res gestae.
This is a clarification in theory only. The ris gestae requirement lends no as-
sistance as a practical guide to admissibility. Thus the declaration must be
characterized as a "verbal act."
8I State v. Boswell, 194 N.C. 260, 139 S.E. 374 (1927) ; State v. Brady, 107
N.C. 822, 12 S.E. 325 (1890).
- 199 N.C. 278, 154 S.E. 604 (1930). See also State v. Batts, 210 N.C. 659,
18 S.E. 99 (1936), where the commission of independent crimes by one conspira-
tor was held competent to prove the-conspiracy.
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admissibility.18 3 Often it would be impossible to prove an agreement at
all if the acts of the parties, both before and after the commission of the
objective crime, were not admissible to show that agreement.18 4
Various justifications, or explanations, for the rule have been
offered, most of which find support in the North Carolina cases. The
theory most frequently advanced is that a mutual agency is created
by the agreement.8 5  Thus, a declaration of one conspirator is not
hearsay as to the others because it is considered to have been made by
all by virtue of the agency. This rationale has been rejected by Wig-
more,18 6 who insists that the evidence is hearsay but is reliable since
it is normally a declaration against interest.x87 The most persuasive
reason for admitting declarations of co-conspirators seems to be that
of pure necessity. "The substantive law of conspiracy has vastly ex-
panded. This created a tension solved by relaxation in the law of
evidence."
88
Whatever the justification, it must be conceded that the rule places
the defendant at a great disadvantage. For example, in State v.
Walker'8 9 the State's witness was permitted to testify that certain de-
fendants had told him that. one Payton did not desire to be connected
with the plot but that Payton would reimburse the expenses advanced
to the witness for his supposed furtherance of the conspiracy.190 The
other evidence against Payton was slight. All defendants elected not
to take the stand. Thus the only means by which the testimony could
practically be attacked was by cross-examination of the State's witness.
The defendants who allegedly made the statements could not be called
upon to refute them, without submitting themselves to incriminatory
cross-examination. When it is considered that in many instances the
State's witness is himself a criminal and often is either being paid by
... Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
"" See, e.g., State v. Finley, 118 N.C. 1162, 24 S.E. 495 (1896).
185 See Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1926); MORGAN,
The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARv. L. REv. 461 (1929). Cf. State
v. Shipman, 202 N.C. 518, 527, 163 S.E. 657, 662 (1932) ("by agreeing with
another . . . he thereby places his safety and security in the hands of every
member of the conspiracy"). See also STANSBuRY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE
§173 (1946).
4 WGmoRE, EVIDENCE, § 1080a (3d ed. 1940).
187 According to Wigmore this is the rationale for all admissions. Where the
declarations are made in furtherance of the conspiracy, they are considered vicar-
ious admissions. WIGmoRE, op. cit. supra note 186. This analysis, then, feeds
upon the agency theory. See Note, 25 U. CHm. L. REv. 530 (1958)."I LaviE, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 1159, 1166 (1954).
189 251 N.C. 465, 112 S.E2d 61 (1959).
... See the dissent of Jusice Bobbitt, id. at 484, 112 S.E.2d at 75, where it
is said that these declarations were incompetent. But see, State v. Turner, 119
N.C. 841, 25 S.E. 810 (1896). In the Turner case there was no opportunity to
cross-examine the party who was alleged to have uttered the statements, because
he was not on trial. Even so, one of the co-conspirators turned state's evidence




the State, as in the Walker case, or has a personal grudge against the
defendant,' 9 ' it becomes obvious that such testimony has no inherent
veracity to recommend it. The situation is fraught with the hazard of
erroneous conviction.
In recognition of these dangers the court has imposed the "fur-
therance" and "pendency" requirements. One way of stating the
furtherance requirement is that declarations of co-conspirators "are
not admissible when in the nature of narratives, descriptions, or sub-
sequent confessions."'' 92 The declarations must be made with an intent
to aid in bringing about the object of the conspiracy. Thus in State
v. Wells'03 conspirator A told conspirator B that the defendant had
"gone to see about getting the key [to a school] from the janitor." In
a prosecution for conspiracy to burn the school acceptance of B's testi-
mony relating the declaration was held to be reversible error. Similarly,
proof of statements of co-conspirators made to discourage commission
of the objective crime'9 4 or made to officers after the arrest 9 5 is inad-
missible. But proof of a conversation conducted in the absence of the
defendant wherein as a matter of convenience his associates agreed to
modify the plan to rob is admissible against the absent defendant. 196
From these examples, it is apparent that the furtherance require-
ments stems from the agency theory of the exception. It would seem
analogous to the "course and scope of the employment" doctrine in the
law of agency. If a conspirator utters declarations not in furtherance
of the common purpose, they are incompetent as evidence against his
"principal" co-conspirators. But the furtherance requirement does
not exclude evidence which has an independent competency. Any
declaration of defendant amounting to an admission on his part is
admissible against him, 9 7 although not made in furtherance. Similarly.
if there has been direct testimony by one defendant of an agreement
"' See State v. Whiteside, 204 N.C. 710, 169 S.E. 711 (1933).
... State v. Wells, 219 N.C. 354, 356, 13 S.E.2d 613, 614 (1941).
Ibid.
State v. Ritter, 197 N.C. 113, 147 S.E. 733 (1929). But cf. the same case
on the second appeal, 199 N.C. 116, 154 S.E. 62 (1930).
... State v. Potter, 252 N.C. 312, 113 S.E. 573 (1960). In State v. Dean, 35
N.C. 63 (1851), it was held that admission of the testimony required reversal
even though the court conceded that a conspiracy was proved by other evidence.
... State v. Summerlin, 232 N.C. 333, 60 S.E.2d 322 (1950). See also State v.
Bennett, 237 N.C. 749, 76 S.E.2d 42 (1953), where the witness, a co-conspirator,
over objection of conspirator A, was permitted to testify that he paid B and C,
co-conspirators, for certain doors, the theft of which was the object of the con-
spiracy.
... See State v. Turner, 119 N.C. 841, 25 S.E. 810 (1896), where the witness
was permitted to testify that "they" (both defendants) had told him a certain
party not on trial was their agent in the conspiracy. Cf. State v. Davis, 87
N.C. 514 (1882).
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between two defendants, statements not in furtherance may be admitted
to corroborate that testimony.198
As noted, confessions are never in furtherance of the conspiracy
and should never be admitted against a co-conspirator. 190 Nevertheless,
the confession is admissible on the joint trial if the judge instructs the
jury that it may be used only against the confessor.2 0 0 Because of the
nature of the crime, the confession must relate that the confessor agreed
with other persons. If the confessor is a State's witness, he may of
course be cross-examined. In this situation it seems that there is no
particular prejudice to the defendant, other than that already noted in
the discussion of co-conspirator's testimony.20 1 But if the confession
is held competent when the confessor is not directly examined there is
a possibility of greater prejudice,2 2 and the effectiveness of the judge's




Confessions may be admitted upon another theory. In State v. Mur-
ray20 4 two defendants were indicted for murder upon the theory that
the homicide was committed pursuant to a conspiracy. Each defend-
ant confessed to an officer in the presence of the other. The trial judge
instructed that each confession was competent against both defendants.
This instruction was held proper, upon the theory that each defendant
by his silence had assented to and adopted the statement of the other.
The pendency rule requires that the statements be made during the
conspiracy. It seems logically impossible for declarations to be made
in furtherance of the objectives of a conspiracy, but not during its
pendency.205 For example, A, the instigator of the plot, could approach
B to solicit aid in a planned bank robbery. If A and C are later in-
dicted for conspiracy to rob, will A's overtures to B be admissible
against C?
Clearly, the declarations were made in furtherance of wibat later
became the object of the conspiracy, but at the time the declarations
were made there was no conspiracy. The statements could not, then,
198 See State v. Potter, 252 N.C. 312, 113 S.E.2d 573 (1960) ; State v. Stancill,
178 N.C. 683, 100 S.E. 241 (1919).
... State v. Smith, 221 N.C. 400, 20 S.E.2d 360 (1942); State v. Bennett, 237
N.C. 749, 76 S.E.2d 42 (1953).
zoo Ibid.
21 See State v. Smith, 221 N.C. 400, 20 S.E.2d 360 (1942).
202 See State v. Anderson, 208 N.C. 771, 182 S.E. 643 (1935), where officers
obtained the confession of one defendant by informing him that others had con-
fessed, when in fact they had not. The court held that the confession should
not have been admitted since it was involuntary. But the co-conspirators were
not permitted to object to the admission of the confession.
20 See Lavm, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MicH. L. Ray. 1159 (1954).
1'216 N.C. 681, 6 S.E.2d 513 (1940).
... See State v. Wells, 219 N.C. 354, 356, 13 S.E.2d 613, 614 (1941), where
the court, after stating the furtherance rule, said, "This we conceive to apply
as a limitation upon the admission of evidence where the acts or declarations are
made pending the conspiracy . . .'
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have been in furtherance of the conspiracy. Upon this theory, the
solicitations of A could not be used against C. Likewise, statements
made by one conspirator after the unlawful object has been consum-
mated, and the agreement is therefore at an end, are not admissible
against his cohorts. 208 The furtherance rule would also exclude such
statements. While it may be impossible for a statement to be made in
furtherance which was not also made during the pendency of a con-
spiracy, statements may be made during pendency which are not in
furtherance. The "narrative" statement, previously discussed, is an
example; such statement is inadmissible even though made during the
pendency of the conspiracy. Consequently, the "pendency" formulation
apparently serves no useful purpose.
Other Evidence
To render hearsay statements of a co-conspirator competent, "there
must be evidence aliunde of the existence of the conspiracy at the time
and the participation therein of the party against whom the evidence
is offered.12 0 7 This independent evidence requirement is a further pre-
caution against too hasty a conviction. Thus if the only evidence in a
case connecting a defendant with the conspiracy is hearsay, the court
will reverse his conviction. 208 But the manner and time in which the
evidence is introduced to prove a conspiracy is in the sound discretion
of the trial court.2 9 The trial judge may first permit the hearsay and
then accept the other evidence on which its admissibility depends.
2 10
If the trial judge finds the other evidence sufficient to support a
conviction, then the case may be sent to the jury. Thus the hearsay is
used only as corroboration of the independent evidence. But neither
judge nor jury need make an independent finding of fact as to the
weight of the other evidence. It seems likely that the independent evi-
dence requirement is frequently lost in this procedural laxity.2 1'
VicARious LIABILITY OF CONSPIRATORS
The classic examples of criminal responsibility for the act of another
are found in the aider and abettor and in the accessory before the fact.
To constitute one an aider and abettor, he must be at least constructively
... State v. Brady, 107 N.C. 822, 12 S.E. 325 (1890); State v. Earwood, 75
N.C. 210 (1876).
"' State v. Benson, 234 N.C. 263, 264, 66 S.E.2d 893, 894 (1951). See also
State v. Blanton, 227 N.C. 517, 42 S.E.2d 663 (1947).
'°' State v. Benson, sipra note 207.
"' State v. Brown, 204 N.C. 392, 168 S.E. 532 (1933).
210 State v. Shipman, 202 N.C. 518, 163 S.E. 657 (1932); State v. Boswell,
194 N.C. 260, 139 S.E. 374 (1927); State v. Jackson, 82 N.C. 565 (1880).
"' See, e.g., State v. Walker, 251 N.C. 465, 112 S.E2d 61, cert. denied, 364
U.S. 832 (1960), where the court uses the hearsay in substantiating its finding
that there was sufficient evidence to carry the case to the jury.
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present at the commission of the crime, rendering aid or encouragement
to the'perpetrator. 212  An accessory before the fact is defined as one
who shall "counsel, procure or command any person to commit any
felony. '213 Under North Carolina law, aiders and abettors are guilty
as principals and may be punished to the same extent as the actual
perpetrator.214 All accessories before the fact to misdemeanors are
guilty as principals,2 15 but an accessory before the fact to felony is no
longer punishable as a principal in North Carolina. 210
The liability of a co-conspirator, as frequently stated, is a good deal
broader than that of either of the above two categories. It is said,
"Everyone who enters into a common purpose or design is equally
deemed in law a party to every act which had before been done by the
others, and a party to every act which may afterwards be done by any
of the others, in furtherance of such common design. '217 A number
of problems are inherent in this statement: whether the two terms "ac-
cessory before the fact" and a "conspirator" are synonymous when the
object is felony; whether the court really means that one may be guilty
of a crime committed by the group before he joined it; whether a de-
fendant may be convicted of murder when he has agreed only to the
commission of a misdemeanor.
In the early case of State v. Hardin18 Chief Justice Ruffin laid
down the principle that "presence, ... in its legal sense, generally dis-
tinguishes the guilt of a principal from that of an accessory. '219 In
that case a conviction for stealing a slave, a capital offense, was re-
versed. The Chief Justice conceded that a conspiracy to steal slaves,
to which the defendant was a party, had been shown. "But the con-
certing of such a plan does not make all the parties to it guilty as
principals upon a subsequent stealing of a slave by any one of them. ' 220
Yet, some twenty years later the court without citation of authority,
declared in a dictum, "It is a well established principle, that where two
agree to do an unlawful act, each is responsible for the act of the
other, provided it be done in pursuance of the original understanding,




212 See Note, 35 N.C.L. Rwv. 285 (1957).
21 N.C. GEr. STAT. § 14-5 (1953).
21, E.g., State v. Jarrell, 141 N.C. 722, 53 S.E. 127 (1906).
215 See State v. Skeen, 182 N.C. 844, 109 S.E. 71 (1921).
21. N.C. GEr. STAT. § 14-6 (1953). The punishment for accessories before the
fact to murder, arson, burglary, or rape is life imprisonment; to horse stealing,
five to twenty years; to any other felony, not more than ten years.
21. State v. Williams, 216 N.C. 446, 448, 5 S.E.2d 314, 315 (1939). See also
State v. Smith, 221 N.C. 400, 20 S.E.2d 360 (1942) ; State v. Anderson, 208 N.C.
771, 182 S.E. 643 (1935).
2-19 N.C. 407 (1837).
219 Id. at 412.
220 Ibid.
2 State v. Simmons, 51 N.C. 21. 24 (1858). Substantially the same state-
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In the vast majority of cases in which it has been stated that one
conspirator is guilty of a crime perpetrated by his associates either the
statement was addressed to the admissibility of evidence2 22 or the de-
fendant was present, aiding and abetting.223 It is apparent that these
cases are not authority for. holding a conspirator vicariously liable as
a principal for crimes committed in his absence, whether they are in
furtherance of the conspiracy or not. In addition, if all conspirators
are guilty of every crime in furtherance then one conspirator could not
logically be guilty of both the conspiracy and the objective crime when
a co-conspirator has been found guilty of only the conspiracy. Yet,
such a conviction was affirmed by our court.22
The distinction between the liability of an aider and abettor and
that of a conspirator deserves examination. If a conspiracy is showni
it may safely be said that a conspirator present at the commission of the
crime will be held to be an aider and abettor. He is therefore guilty
as a principal,2 25 but his liability should be predicated upon his aiding
and not upon the- conspiracy. A case in point is State v. Brooks. 
22
There it was shown that three defendants had entered a conspiracy to
escape from prison. They overpowered a guard and took his rifle
with which one defendant killed another guard. Upon appeal from a
conviction of murder in the first degree, two defendants argued that
they had agreed only to the jail-break, a misdemeanor, and should not
be held for the killing perpetrated by their co-conspirator. The court
observed that the defendants were active participants in the homicide,
giving aid and assistance. Thus, they were guilty of the homicide
under traditional concepts of vicarious liability, i.e., they were present,
aiders and abettors. Defendants were said to be guilty of "all acts com-
mitted by the others in the execution of the common purpose which are
a natural or probable consequence of the unlawful combination or un-
dertaking, even though such acts are not intended or contemplated as
ment was made in State v. Jackson, 82 N.C. 565 (1880), but the court was there
dealing with the admissibility of acts of one conspirator to prove the conspiracy
and not with vicarious liability.
22 The crimes may be admitted in evidence against the absent conspirator but
only for the purpose of proving the conspiracy. See State v. Shipman, 202 N.C.
518, 163 S.E. 657 (1932).
... See, e.g., State v. Flowers, 211 N.C. 721, 192 S.E. 110 (1937); State v.
Rideout, 189 N.C. 156, 126 S.E. 500 (1925); State v. Orr, 175 N.C. 773, 94 S.E.
721 (1917) ; State v. Knotts, 168 N.C. 173, 83 S.E. 972 (1914) ; State v. Powell,
168 N.C. 134, 83 S.E. 310 (1914) ; State v. Bowman, 152 N.C. 817, 67 S.E. 1058
(1910) ; State v. Finley 118 N.C. 1162, 24 S.E. 495 (1896) ; State v. Chastain,
104 N.C. 900, 10 S.E. 519 (1889); State v. Anderson, 92 N.C. 733 (1885). In
State v. Chastain, supra, defendant was hiding with a rifle in the bushes 150
yards away from the scene of the assault. He was held guilty as a principal in
the assault, but the court expressly found that he was within rifle shot ready to
render aid if it proved necessary.
22 State v. Shipman, 202 N.C. 518, 163 S.E. 657 (1932).
' See Note, 35 N.C.L. Rav. 285 (1957).
26 228 N.C. 68, 44 S.E.2d 482 (1947).
1961]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
a part of the original design. '2 7 The question of what acts are "natural
and probable" consequences, is one of considerable uncertainty.22 8 But
it is nevertheless clear that liability in this type of case is essentially
the liability of an aider and abettor. An illustration would seem to
clarify the point. Suppose that on the night before the break another
prisoner had agreed to, join the defendants in Brooks. But before the
appointed time he was sent to solitary confinement and at the time of
the break was nowhere in the vicinity. Would it be argued that he is
guilty of murder? If the dictum is as broad as its language indicates,
lie would be.
The broad manner in which the basis for liability is enunciated has
led to questionable results in other types of cases. Thus, in State v.
Summerlin22 a conspiracy to rob with firearms was charged. Defend-
ants was charged also with aiding and abetting in the completed rob-
bery. But the evidence showed that the defendant was not present at
the time of the actual robbery. He was nevertheless found guilty on
both counts. The acts of defendant's co-conspirators were admissible
to prove the conspiracy, and defendant's exceptions related to the ad-
mission of these acts and declarations. The court therefore was not
called upon to determine the vicarious liability of defendant for the
robbery, but it nevertheless stated that he was so liable because of the
conspiracy, whether present or not. If the Summerlin case holds the
defendant punishable as a principal to the robbery, it is directly con-
trary to well-considered North Carolina authority.
230
The sentence for the robbery in the Summerlin case, which was less
than the. maximum sentence prescribed for an accessory, ran concur-
rently with the sentence for the conspiracy. Thus, it was immaterial to
the defendant whether he was convicted as an accessory or as a
principal. 231  The sentence would have been the same in either case.
But when the indictment charges a crime for which a principal may
be punished to a greater extent than an accessory, it becomes vital to
distinguish between the principal and the accessory. Although the
accessory may be convicted upon a charge of the crime itself,232 he may
not be sentenced in excess of the statutory limit.
Where the object of the conspiracy is a misdemeanor, no problem
is encountered in distinguishing between the liability of the several
227 Id. at 71, 44 S.E.2d at 483.
28 See, e.g., State v. Finley, 118 N.C. 1162, 24 S.E. 495 (1896), where the
purpose of defendants was said to be that of "annoying" the deceased by "taking
his hat from him, by boxing and slapping him violently, by threatening to put
him in the lockup." Both defendants were held guilty of murder, although it
was not possible to determine accurately which one struck the fatal blow.
229232 N.C. 333, 60 S.E.2d 322 (1950).
220 See note 213, .supra, and accompanying text.
... State v. Smith, 221 N.C. 400, 20 S.E.2d 360 (1942).
2.. State v. Bryson, 173 N.C. 803, 92 S.E. 698 (1917).
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conspirators for the objective crime. The facts required to constitute
one an accessory to a felony will, if the crime is a misdemeanor only,
render him a principal to the offense.233 A conspirator by agreeing to
aid in the commission of the offense "advises and procures" its commis-
sion. He is therefore guilty of the misdemeanor whether he was pres-
ent or not. A problem may arise, however, where one of the con-
spirators commits a felony in the perpetration of the misdemeanor. It
is at least arguable that in such a case a conspirator who was not pres-
ent at the time should not be guilty of the felony purely by virtue of
the conspiracy. But if the dicta of the North Carolina cases is followed,
he will be.2 34  If he is to be held criminally responsible for the felony,
it should be upon the theory that he "advised and procured" and com-
mission of all foreseeable crimes in pursuit of the objective mis-
demeanor and is therefore guilty in the commission of the felony as
accessory only.235
When the object of the conspiracy is a felony, all conspirators are
accessories before the fact to the objective crime. Accessory before the
fact is a substantive felony. They should not also be guilty as prin-
cipals, unless they are present at the scene of the crime.238 Otherwise,
the statutes defining accessories and their punishment would be mean-
ingless. When a crime other than the objective crime is committed by
one of the conspirators, it seems that the most logical view would hold
the other conspirators guilty as accessories, so long as it was foreseeable
that the crime might be committed in the perpetration of the objective
felony. This result is in harmony with the North Carolina dicta except
in one aspect; the dicta would hold all conspirators guilty as principals.
The only result flowing from this distinction is the degree:of punishment
to which the defendant may be subjected. It seems that the conspiracy
indictment is a sufficiently powerful deterrent to group crime. To
follow the dicta and hold all conspirators to be principals would seem
... See State v. Barden, 12 N.C. 518 (1828)..Although no North Carolina case has been found directly holding a con-
spirator guilty of the crime in this situation, the leading case of Pinkerton v.
United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), seems to be authority for such a holding.
... See State v. Lewis, 185 N.C. 640, 116 S.E. 259 (1923) ; State v. Hardin,
19 N.C. 407 (1837).
." This has generally been the rule, but there is one exception. A conspirator
to the crime of larceny, whether felony or misdemeanor, is guilty of the com-
mitted larceny as principal. "This is true because of the peculiar rule which
prevails in North Carolina in respect to persons concerned in the commission of
a felonious larceny." State v. Bennett, 237 N.C. 749, 752, 76 S.E.2d 42, 43
(1953). The "peculiar rule" apparently stems from the case of State v. Gaston,
73 N.C. 93 (1875), where it was pointed out that G.S. §14-70 converted all
simple larceny to misdemeanors. The rule is "peculiar" because it is applied
to felonious larceny. The exception is carried over from the common law,
where petit larceny and treason were the only felonies in which it was not pos-
sible to have an accessory. All who participated in these crimes were principals,
whether present or not. 4 BLACKSTONE, CO MmNTARiES *36.
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an unwarranted extension in the face of the accessory statutes. If A
and B should conspire to burn a church, for example, and in pursuance
of the conspiracy A should burn it, B should be guilty as accessory.
His maximum imprisonment would be ten years. If he were held
guilty as principal, he could be imprisoned for forty years.
23 7
JACK W. FLOYD
Damages-Loss of Use Recoverable in an Action
for the Negligent Destruction of a Chattel.
In Reynolds v. Bank of America1 plaintiff's airplane was abandoned
at sea and destroyed as a result of the negligent act of the person to
whom it had been leased. In an action against the negligent actor's
estate plaintiff sought, in addition to the value of the plane, special
damages for loss of use until a replacement could be obtained. The
trial court held that loss of use was not compensable where the chattel
had been completely destroyed. On appeal the California Supreme
Court reversed. The court pointed out that loss of use was compen-
sable where the chattel had been damaged but was repairable and stated,
There appears to be no logical or practical reason why a distinc-
tion should be drawn between cases in which the property is
totally destroyed and those in which it has been injured but is
repairable, and . . . when the owner of a negligently destroyed
commerical vehicle has suffered injury by being deprived of the
use of the vehicle during the period required for replacement, he
is entitled... to recover for loss of use in order to "compensate
for all the detriment proximately caused" by the wrongful de-
struction.2
Jurisdictions have not been uniform as to the measure of damages
recoverable by reason of the deprication of the use of a chattel through
its wrongful injury or its destruction.3 Furthermore, aside from this
conflict where the right to recover is conceded, historically there has
been a distinction made between property which is completely destroyed
and property which is repairable in determining whether loss of use
is an element of damages at all.Where a chattel has been injured but is repairable, the basic meas-
ure of damages is the difference in value before and after the injury.
4
2 7 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-62 (1953).
153 Cal. 2d 49, 345 P.2d 926 (1959), Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 719 (1960).
Id. at 50, 345 P.2d at 927. It should be noted that the CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3333
provides that the basic measure of damages "for the breach of an obligation not
arising from contract . . . is the amount which vill compensate for all the
detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or
not."
3 Compare Lamb v. Landers, 67 Ga. App. 588, 21 S.E.2d 321 (1942), with
Kopischki v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0, Ry., 40 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. 1950).
'15 A. Jua. Damages § 124 (1938); 25 C.J.S. Damages §83 (1941).
[Vol. 39
NOTES AND COMMENTS
In addition, a vast majority of jurisdictions allow special damages for
loss of use of the chattel.5 To be compensable these special damages
must be the natural and probable result of the wrongful act,6 though
they need not be foreseeable.1 The loss of use is measured by either
the rental value of the property" or the resulting loss of profits.9
When a chattel has been completely destroyed, the basic measure-
ment of damages is the value at the time of the accident less salvage
value.' The majority of jurisdictions have not allowed loss of use in a
case of complete destruction,"' but some variations to this rule have
been established. Where it was not possible to ascertain immediately
whether the injured chattel was repairable, the plaintiff in some in-
stances has been allowed damages for loss of use during the period
5E.g., Valencia v. Shell Oil Co., 23 Cal. 2d 840, 147 P.2d 558 (1944); Barr
v. Searcy, 280 Ky. 535, 133 S.W. 2d 714 (1939); Hanson v. Hall, 202 Minn. 381,
279 N.W. 227 (1938) ; 25 CJ.S. Damages § 41 (1941) ; Annot., 169 A.L.R. 1074
(1947).
'Reliable Trucking Co. v. Payne, 233 N.C. 637, 65 S.E.2d 132 (1951) ; Steffan
v. Meiselnan, 223 N.C. 154, 25 S.E.2d 626 (1943), 25 CJ.S. Damages §23
(1941).
"Western Union Tel. Co. v. Guard, 283 Ky. 187, 139 S.W.2d 722 (1940);
Johnson v. Railroad, 140 N.C. 574, 53 S.E. 362 (1906).
8 Rental value is the preferable measure when similar property can be rented,
for the plaintiff can mitigate his loss by renting a substitute. Hanson v. Hall.
202 Minn. 381, 279 N.W. 227 (1938); Francischini v. McMullen, 6 N.J. Misc.
736, 142 AUt. 651 (1928); 5A Am. Jun. Automobiles § 1116 (1956). Rental
value would also be used when the lost profits are too speculative or remote to
be ascertained with a reasonable degree of certainty. Buchanan v. Leonard, 127
F. Supp. 120 (D. Colo. 1954) ; Sledge v. Reid, 73 N.C. 440 (1873).
Loss of use of a pleasure vehicle is compensable in a majority of jurisdictions.
See, e.g., Atlanta Furniture Co. v. Walker, 51 Ga. App. 781, 181 S.E. 498 (1935) ;
Newman v. Brown, 228 S.C. 472, 90 S.E.2d 649 (1955). See also 5A Am. JUR.
Automobiles § 1115 (1956); Annot., 169 A.L.R. 1100 (1947). Contra, Hunter
v. Quaintance, 69 Colo. 28, 168 Pac. 918 (1917). The measure of damages in
these cases is the fair rental value of the automobile. Bates v. General Steel
Tank Co;j 36 Ala. App. 261, 55 So. 2d 213 (1951); Atlanta Furniture Co. v.
Walker, Supra. It is significant to note that loss of use is allowed even if no
replacement was actually hired, according to the majority view. See, e.g., Hansen
v. Costello, 125 Conn. 386, 5 A.2d 880 (1939) ; Pitarri v. Madison Ave. Coach Co.,
188 Misc. 614, 68 N.Y.S.2d 741 (New York City Ct 1947); Glass v. Miller, 44
Ohio L. Abs. 278, 51 N.E.2d 299 (Ohio Ct. App. 1940) ; Newman v. Brown, 228
S.C. 472, 90 S.E.2d 649 (1955).
' Loss or profits may be recoverable if the plaintiff is unable to mitigate his
damages. Knapp v. Styer 280 F.2d 384 (8th Cir. 1960); Reliable Trucking Co.
v. Payne, 233 N.C. 637, 65 S.E.2d 132 (1951). It has been held that the plaintiff
must show that similar property was not available for rental before he can re-
cover lost profits. Hanson v. Hall, supra note 8; Francischini v. McMullen,
supra note 8.. Loss of profits may also be proper when the plaintiff is financially
unable to mitigate, Valencia v. Shell Oil Co., 23 Cal. 2d 840, 147 1'.2d 558 (1944),
and it is commonly recovered when the injury is to real property. See, e.g.,
Steffan v. Meiselman, 223 N.C. 154, 25 S.E.2d 626 (1943). See generally, 34
N.C.L. Ray. 357 (1956).
10 15 Am. JuR. Damages § 121 (1938); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 83 (1941).
1 E.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Harrell, 66 F. Supp 559 (W.D. Okla.
1946) ; Hunt v. Ward, 262 Ala. 379, 79 So. 2d 20 (1955) ; Pellegrin v. Hebert,
107 So. 2d 853 (La. App. 1959); Helin v. Egger, 121 Neb. 727, 238 N.W.
364 (1931); Hayes Freight Lines, Inc. v. Tarver, 192 Ohio St. 82, 73 N.E. 2d
192 (1947); Cogbill v. Martin, 308 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); 5A Am.
Jun. Automobiles § 1115; Annot., 169 A.L.R. 1074 (1947).
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necessary for this determination, even if repair subsequently proved
impractical. 12 Other cases have held that loss of use was compensable
when the chattel was completely destroyed, but the total recovery has
been limited to the value of the chattel before the injury.'8 Since the
basic measure of value before and after would cover the entire value
except the salvage value, this rule would limit the amount recoverable
for loss of use to the salvage value.1
4
The refusal to allow loss of use in a case of complete destruction
seems to be a holdover from the common law action of trover, which
was an action for conversion, and in which loss of use was not allowed.
When a chattel was completely destroyed, an imaginary passing of
title was effected, vesting ownership in the defendant. The plaintiff
then no longer had title, and thus he could not recover for the loss of
use of that which he did not own.'r
In North Carolina the basic measure of damages is the difference
in the value of the chattel before and after the injury.1 In addition,
loss of use had been allowed where the chattel was damaged but repair-
able.'7 But the question of whether the owner of a chattel which has
been wrongfully destroyed may recover for loss of use has not been
definitely decided. It appears likely, however, that our court would
allow loss of use in this situation.
In Kitchen Lumber Co. v. Taia.cee Power Co.'- plaintiff's bridge
was destroyed through the negligence of the defendant. In addition
to the value of the bridge the plaintiff sought a recovery for the loss of
profits resulting from his inability to remove his timber without the
bridge. The court, while reversing as to proof of the lost profits,
stated that both the value of the Ibridge and the lost profits might be
1M Morgan v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 100 So. 2d 279 (La. App. 1958).
Lamb. v. Landers, 67 Ga. App. 588, 21 S.E.2d 321 (1942); Kohl v. Arp,
236 Iowa 31, 17 N.W.2d 824 (1945); Anderson v. Rexroad, 180 Kan. 505, 306
P.2d 137 (1957).
14 Assume that the plane in the principal case, worth $30,000, had crashed on
the land and had a salvage value of $500. The difference in value before the
accident and that after would be $29,500. If the amount were limited to the
value before the accident, loss of use could not exceed $500, as compared to the
$5,000 actually claimed.
11 1 SEDGwICK, DAMAGES § 178 (8th ed. Sedgwick & Beale 1891). Under this
theory, some jurisdictions have held. that total damages for injury to a chattel,
including loss of use, may not exceed the value of the chattel before the injury.
Brooks Transp. Co. v. McCutcheon, 154 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Lamb v.
Landers, 67 Ga. App. 588, 21 S.E.2d 321 (1942). These courts reason that since
the plaintiff could recover only the value of the chattel had it been completely
destroyed, damages in a larger amount should not be allowed where the harm
done to the chattel was less. Ibid.1. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. P. & F. Motor Express, Inc., 220 N.C.
721, 18 S.E.2d 116 (1942).
" Reliable Trucking Co. v. Payne, 233 N.C. 637, 65 S.E.2d 132 (1951). It"
is not clear whether loss of use is considered special damages. The safer method
is to plead them as such. 1 MclNTrOS, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1079(3) (2d ed. 1956).
18206 N.C. 515, 174 S.E. 427 (1934).
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recovered. In Binder v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.1 9 plaintiff
sought damages for the conversion of his automobile which he used in
his business. Even though there was ho allegation of lost profits re-
suiting from the conversion, the court held that loss of use was a proper
element of damages. As has been noted, the apparent reason some ju-
risdictions do not allow loss of use for complete destruction is that loss
of use was not allowed for conversion at common law. Since North
Carolina allows loss of use in actions for conversion, it is arguable that
loss of use should be allowed in a case of negligent destruction.
The language used by the court in Reliable Trucking Co. v. Payne
2
0
seems broad enough to allow loss of use for a destroyed chattel. In an
action for injury to his tractor-trailer the plaintiff sought property
damage and loss of use for two and one half months necessary for re-
pair. The court stated, "Under the modern rule, then, it may be said
that lost profits constitute a proper element of damage where such loss
is the direct and necessary result of the defendant's wrongful conduct,
and such profits are capable of being shown with a reasonable degree of
certainty."
'2'
As pointed out by the principal case, there seems to be little logic
in allowing loss of use for a damaged chattel but not for a destroyed
chattel. Refusal to compensate for loss of use may result in a consider-
able loss to the plaintiff ;22 if the destroyed property is not readily
replaceable and the plaintiff suffers a loss from the deprivation, he can-
not be fully compensated unless he recovers for the loss of use. The
detriment to the plaintiff is no more speculative or remote than that
suffered when a chattel is damaged but repairable, and in both instances
he is deprived of use of the chattel by the wrongful act of the defendant.
The duty of the plaintiff to mitigate will prevent useless delay in re-
placement.2 3  It is urged that North Carolina follow the reasoning
expressed in the principal case, the Restatement of Torts,2 4 and a grow-
ing minority of jurisdictions.
25
JAMEs H. CARSON, JR.
10222 N.C. 512, 23 S.E.2d 894 (1943).
20233 N.C. 637, 65 S.E2d 132 (1951).
21 Id. at 639, 65 S.E.2d at 133. In this case the amount claimed by the plaintiff
for the injury to the trailer plus that claimed for loss of use exceeded the value
of the trailer prior to the injury. The court made no mention of limiting the
total recovery to the value of the trailer before injury which, as has been seen
(.npra note 15), is the rule of the courts which refuse loss of use for a destroyed
chattel on the common law trover theory.
2 In the principal case the plaintiff claimed $5,000 for loss of profits as a
result of the destruction of the airplane.
" Howard v. Adams, 246 S.W2d 1002 (Ky. 1952); Newman v. Brown, 228
S.C. 472, 90 S.E.2d 649 (1955).
'RSTATEMENT, TORTS § 927 (1939).
"IBnapp v. Styer, 280 F.2d 384 (8th Cir. 1960); Guido v. Hudson Transit
Lines, Inc., 178 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1949); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Blanton, 304
Ky. 127, 200 S.W.2d 133 (1947); Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah 339,
241 P.2d 914 (1952).
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Torts-Speed Exemption Statute-Standard of Care in Operation
of Police Vehicles-Liability of City, County, or State for Negligence
of Police Officers.
The North Carolina speed exemption statute1 provides:
The speed limitations ... shall not apply to vehicles when
operated with due regard for safety under the direction of the
police in the chase or apprehension of violators of the law or
of persons ... suspected of any such violation .... This exemp-
tion shall not, however, protect the driver of any such vehicle
from the consequences of a reckless disregard of the safety of
others.
In Goddard v. Williams2 the court applied this statute and con-
sidered its effect upon the standard of care required of police officers
in the performance of their official duties. The plaintiff brought an
action against a deputy sheriff to recover for injuries sustained in a
collision between the plaintiff's automobile and the officer's patrol ve-
hicle. The plaintiff was proceeding down a city street at night and
began to make a left turn into a driveway. The defendant, in his patrol
vehicle, approached from the plaintiff's rear at a speed of seventy miles
per hour and struck the plaintiff's vehicle on the left side.
The officer testified that he was driving seventy miles per hour when
he was within twenty-five feet of the point of collision. He alleged in
the answer, however, that at the time of the accident he was pursuing
the plaintiff for failure to obey a stop sign and that the patrol vehicle's
siren and red light were in operation. He filed a counterclaim alleging
that the plaintiff's negligence was the sole cause of the accident.
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-145 (1953). This statute also applies to fire depart-
ment vehicles, ambulances and the vehicles of the Utilities Commission provided
they are on official business. The seemingly conflicting provisions of "due regard
for safety" and "reckless disregard of the safety of others" contained in speed
exemption statutes have caused confusion in determining the standard of care
required of police officers. In construing a statute similar to North Carolina's
the Arizona Supreme Court stated: "The intent of [the speed exemption
statute] ... is not to hold the patrolman to less than the usual degree or stand-
ard of care. Instead, by its very words the section holds him to 'due regard for
safety' making exception only for the speed at which d patrolman's job sometimes
requires him to travel. The last sentence of this section [the reckless disregard
provision] . . . refers only to the speed exception, and is by its own terms so
limited. It would breach all rules of construction to apply the 'reckless disregard'
standard to any but this speed exception." Ruth v. Rhodes, 66 Ariz. 129, 137, 185
P.2d 304, 309-10 (1947). [Emphasis added.] But cf. Lakoduk v. Cruger, 48 Wash.
2d 642, 296 P.2d 690 (1956), where the court said that "if the driver of an emer-
gency vehicle is at all times required to drive with due regard for the safety of
the public as all other drivers are required to do, then all the provisions of
these statutes relating to emergency vehicles become meaningless and no privileges
are granted to them. But if his 'due regard' for the safety of others means that
he should, by suitable warning, give others a reasonable opportunity to yield the
right of way, the statutes become workable for the purposes intended." Id. at
661-62, 296 P.2d at 701. See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §28-624(d) (1956) ; WAsH.
Rlv. CODE §46.08.050 (1959).
2251 N.C. 128, 110 S.E.2d 820 (1959).
(Vol. 39
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The trial court charged that when a police officer is engaged in the
discharge of his duties in an effort to apprehend an offender and the
offender operates his vehicle so as to guard, hinder, and delay the
arrest, the officer would not be liable upon any aspect of negligence
unless his conduct was wilful and wanton or the injuries were inten-
tionally inflicted.3 The jury returned a verdict for the officer on his
counterclaim.
On appeal the court granted the plaintiff a new trial, holding that
the charge was erroneous and stating that "in such situation, an officer
is liable for his negligent acts as well as for his wilful and wanton
acts."4
As to the standard of care required of the officer while in pursuit,
the court quoted two authorities to the effect that the officer is to exer-
cise the care which a reasonable and prudent man would exercise in
the discharge of official duties of a like nature,under like circumstances. 5
The court then stated that "if . .. the defendant was engaged in his
official duties at the time of the collision... mere speed alone, unaccom-
panied by any recklessness or disregard of the rights of others, would
be insufficient to support an allegation of negligence .... ,
Many duties are imposed upon operators of motor vehicles. The
general duty imposed by statute and the law of torts is to drive with
due care. Virtually all jurisdictions have statutory provisions requiring
'It would seem that the trial court was instructing the jury that the plaintiff
may have been contributorily negligent in trying to hinder or delay arrest
in failing to obey the officer's siren, and in failing to yield the right of way. If
the plaintiff had been found contributorily negligent, he would have been barred
from recovery unless the defendant's acts amounted to wanton or intentional
misconduct. Ballew v. Asheville & E. Tenn. R.R., 186 N.C. 704, 120 S.E. 334
(1923) ; Brendle v. Spencer, 125 N.C. 474, 34 S.E. 634 (1899).
'251 N.C. at 133, 110 S.E.2d at 824. The court stated: "There is no exemption
granted by G.S. 20-145 from reckless and negligent conduct by an officer unless
such reckless and negligent conduct is wilful and wanton, intentional and purpose-
ful, and made for the purpose of injuring the person the officer was seeking to
arrest. In such situation, an officer is liable for his negligent acts as well as
for his wilful and wanton acts." Ibid. (Emphasis added.) This statement is
problematical. If the trial judge was here instructing the jury on the issue of
contributory negligence, the instruction would seem sound. See note 3 supra. If
on the other hand, the trial judge was not instructing on the issue of contributory
negligence, the instruction would seem to be wrong. Apparently, the supreme
court did not consider the former interpretation of the instruction. Even as-
suming the latter interpretation to be correct, the language of the court is not
entirely clear.
'McKay v. Hargis, 351 Mich. 409, 88 N.W.2d 456 (1958); 60 CJ.S. Motor
Vehicles § 375 (1949).
8 251 N.C. at 133, 110 S.E.2d at 824; accord, Goldstein v. Rogers, 93 Cal.
App. 2d 201, 208 P2d 719 (1949) ; McKay v. -Hargis, supra note 5; La Marra v.
Adam, 164 Pa. Super. 268, 63 A.2d 497 (1949). The court also held that the
evidence of the character of the area in which the collision occurred was sufficient
to require its submission to the jury for its determination as to whether it was
residential. If the jury should so find, "then the plaintiff would be entitled to
have the jury consider the conduct of the defendant in the light of the character
of the area . . . whether he was subject to the ... [speed limit] . . .or G.S.
20-145." 251 N.C. at 131, 110 S.E.2d at 823.
1961]
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operators to observe the speed limits, obey stop signs, and yield the
right of way. A violation of these duties may result in negligence. The
speed exemption statute removes the requirement of obeying the speed
limit when an officer is in pursuit of an offender. There is no exemp-
tion for an officer from the duty to maintain a proper lookout, to main-
tain proper control of the vehicle while operating it, or to maintain
the patrol vehicle in proper condition. A violation of these duties
would be a failure to exercise due care or a due regard for safety, and
the officer would be negligent.7 If, however, a speeding officer meets
all of the other duties required of him, then, in order to hold him liable,
his speed must be in reckless disregard of the safety of others. Thus
where speed alone is concerned, it appears from the principal decision
that a different test is to be used in determining whether the officer is
liable.8
Two distinct views have emerged from the decisions as to the offi-
cer's standard of care under speed exemption or right of way statutes.
The precise wording of the statutes varies in each jurisdiction and the
court's construction necessarily depends to some degree upon the
phraseology used.9 The first view is referred to as the Maine rule.10
Court following this rule hold that the exemptions from traffic regula-
tions given to emergency or police vehicles do not relieve their operators
from the duty to exercise due care."' The second view is referred to
as the California rule.12 Courts following this rule hold that the duty
of the officer to use due care is met when he gives adequate warning
of the police vehicle's approach. Liability of the officer may then be
predicated only upon an abuse or arbitrary exercise of the privilege
granted by the speed exemption and right of way statutes.13 Speed
"City of Kalamazoo v. Priest, 331 Mich. 43, 49 N.W.2d 52 (1951).8 The court in the principal case cited Edberg v. Johnson, 149 Minn. 395, 184
N.W. 12 (1921), -where the court said the conduct of the officer in pursuit of a
lawbreaker is to be examined and tested by another standard. He is required to
observe the care which a reasonable and prudent man would exercise in the
discharge of official duties of a like nature under like circumstances.
'ComPare Ruth v. Rhodes, 66 Ariz. 129, 185 P.2d 304 (1947), with Lakoduk
v. Cruger, 48 Wash. 2d 642, 296 P.2d 690 (1956). These courts construed similar
exemption statutes but reached different results.
"oRussel v. Nadeau, 139 Me. 286, 29 A.2d 916 (1943).
" "They are bound to exercise reasonable precaution against the extraordinary
dangers . . . duty compels them to create. They must keep in mind the speed
at which their vehicle is traveling and the probable consequences of their dis-
regard of traffic [regulations] . . . . The measure of their responsibility is due
care under all circumstances." Id. at 288, 29 A.2d at 917; accord, Ruth v. Rhodes,
66 Ariz. 129, 185 P.2d 304 (1947) ; Johnson v. Brown, 75 Nev. 437, 345 P.2d 754
(1959) ; Montalto v. Fond Du Lac County, 272 Wis. 552, 76 N.W2d 279 (1956)."2Lucas v. City of Los Angles, 10 Cal. 2d 476, 75 P.2d 599 (1938).
13 Ibid. The California court indicated that the following would constitute, an
arbitrary exercise of the privilege: (1) emergency operation where there is no
emergency, such as a fire truck returning from a fire or a policeman making
routine runs with no criminal in sight or using the patrol vehicle for personal
use; (2) where the operator sees that another has not heard or heeded the re-
quired warning given by the officer, and the officer persists in speeding or con-
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alone would not constitute an arbitrary exercise of the privilege granted
by such statutes.1 4  It would seem that the courts following the Cali-
fornia "arbitrary exercise" rule require a lesser degree of care on the
part of the officer than those following the Maine "due care" rule. 15
In the Goddard case it appears that the North Carolina court took a
position which incorporated aspects of both the Maine and California
rules. As under the Maine rule, the officer is required to exercise due
care; nevertheless, following the California rule, mere speed alone, un-
less in reckless disregard of the rights of others, will not render the
officer liable.
The North Carolina speed exemption statute applies only when the
officer is operating his vehicle with "due regard for safety."'16 Cali-
fornia17 and Washington' 8 have held that this provision, in their re-
spective statutes,'0 is essentially satisfied when (1) the driver of the
emergency vehicle has by suitable warning given other drivers or
pedestrians an opportunity to yield the right of way and (2) having
discovered the peril in which another has unknowingly or negligently
become involved despite the operation of the required warning devices,
the driver reasonably utilizes any last clear chance to avoid the acci-
dent. The Washington court stated that this was the only reasonable
interpretation of the provision, for if the officer "is at all times required
to drive with due regard for the safety of the public as all other drivers
are required to do, then all the provisions of the speed exemption
statute. . . become meaningless and no privileges are granted .... "20
The question arises as to thd North Carolina position on the issue
of what is required of the officer to satisfy the "due regard for safety"
provision of the speed exemption statute.21 It may not be safely as-
tinues through the intersection; (3) when the conduct of the driver of the emer-
gency vehicle is so reckless that it amounts to wilful misconduct. The court
compared the latter, wilful misconduct, as being analogous to the conduct under
which most guest statutes fix liability. Accord, Lakoduk v. Cruger, 48 Wash.
2d 642, 296 P.2d 690 (1956) See, CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§21055, 21056;
WAsH. REv. CODE § 46.08.050 (1959). The Washington statute, like North Caro-
lina's, provides that the exemption shall not protect the operator of any emergency
vehicle "from the consequences of a reckless disregard for the safety of others."
Apparently the Washington court considered this provision analogous to the
provision of the California statute which provides that the officer is not pro-
tected from the consequences of abuse or arbitrary exercise of the privilege
granted.1 Lucas v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 476, 75 P.2d 599 (1938).
",Compare Lakoduk v. Cruger, 48 Wash. 2d 642, 296 P2d 690 (1956), with
Johnson v. Brown, 75 Nev. 437, 345 P2d 754 (1959).
" Thus, operating the vehicle with "due regard for safety" is a condition pre-
cedent to the applicability of the exemption statute, and it would seem that the
speed of an officer who had not satisfied the condition would be negligence Per se.
"' Balthasar v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 187 Cal. 302, 202 Pac. 37 (1921); Duff v.
Schaefer Ambulance Serv., 132 Cal. App. 2d 655, 283 .P.2d 91 (1955)." Lakoduk v. Cruger, 48 Wash. 2a 642, 296 P2d 690 (1956).
19CAL. VEHICLE CODE §§ 21055, 21056; WASH. Rnv. CODE § 46.08.050 (1959).
10Lakoduck v. Cruger, 48 Wash. 2d 642, 661-62, 296 P.2d 690, 701 (1956).
" "[T]he speed law exemption is effective. only when the officer operates his
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sumed that once he has given a warning he has satisfied the "due
regard for safety" provision.2 The California court has stated that
failure to sound a siren may be considered a lack of "due regard for
safety." -3 As previously stated, the officer is not exempt from the
duty of keeping a proper lookout, of keeping the patrol vehicle in
proper mechanical condition, or of keeping his car under control. It
would appear that in order to meet the "due regard for safety" pro-
vision the officer must fulfill these duties.
24
The only other case reaching the North Carolina Supreme Court
in which an officer relied upon the speed exemption statute is Glosson
v. Trollinger.25  The officer was pursuing the defendant down a wet,
slippery road at forty to fifty miles per hour in a thirty-five mile an
hour speed zone when the defendant stopped suddenly and the officer
struck the rear of the defendant's vehicle. In holding that the issue
of contributory negligence was properly submitted to the jury, the
court emphasized the fact that the defendant had alleged that the officer
was guilty of a "reckless disregard of the rights of others." Apparently
the court in the principal case distinguished the Glosson case on this
basis.26 It would appear that in order to be certain that the complaint
is sufficient to support a finding of liability on the part of the speeding
car 'with due regard to safety' . . . ." Goddard v. Williams, 251 N.C. 128, 133,
110 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1959). Also, by the words of the statute as applied to
police officers, the exemption is effective only when the officer is in pursuit of a
violator of the law or one suspected of a violation. The type or character of the
violation may have some effect upon the court's decision as to whether the
statute is applicable. In Cavey v. City of Bethlehem, 331 Pa. 556, 1 A.2d 653
(1938) (dictum), the court said that clocking a speeding automobile is not such
an emergency duty of the officer as to bring the case within the exemption pro-
vision. The court distinguished Reilly v. City of Philadelphia, 328 Pa. 563,
195 At. 897 (1938), on the grounds that in that case the officers were in close
pursuit of a fleeing felon who was driving a stolen car. In the principal case,
the plaintiff was being pursued for failure to obey a stop sign. Further, the
defendant testified that he recognized the plaintiff's automobile when it passed
the sign. Record, p. 41. Though the statute makes no distinction as to the
type or character of the violation of which the person pursued is suspected, it
would seem that it should be considered as one of the "circumstances" in deciding
whether the officer is justified in speeding or disregarding other traffic violations.
Some of the things to be considered should be (1) the seriousness of the offense,
(2) the chances for future apprehension, especially where the officer recognizes the
offender, and (3) the character of the area in which the officer is driving.
2 It should be noted that North Carolina's right of way statute does require
the officer to give warning. N.C. GEN. SrAT. §20-156(b) (1953). Once this
warning is given the operator of the emergency vehicle is accorded the statutory
privilege of right of way. He has the right to proceed upon the assumption
that when the signal is given other users of the highway will yield the right of
way. Williams v. Sossoman's Funeral Home, Inc., 248 N.C. 524, 103 S.E.2d 714
(1958). Also, "every motor vehicle operated on the highways of the State by
members of the State Highway Patrol shall be equipped with a siren. Whenever
any such officer or member operating an unmarked car shall overtake another
vehicle on the highway after sunset of any day and before sunrise for the purposes
of stopping the same or apprehending the driver thereof, he shall sound said siren
before stopping such other vehicle." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-190.1 (Supp. 1959).
"2 Raynor v. City of Arcata, 11 Cal. 2d 113, 77 P.2d 1054 (1938).
' City of Kalamazoo v. Priest, 331 Mich. 43, 49 N.W.2d 52 (1951).
25227 N.C. 84, 40 S.E.2d 606 (1946).
"' The plaintiff in the principal case alleged in his complaint that the officer
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officer, it should allege that the officer was guilty of a "reckless disre-
gard of the safety of others."
The police officer is generally held personally liable to the same
extent as a private individual. 27  In the principal case the suit was
brought against the deputy sheriff alone, and there was no attempt to
join the sheriff or his surety. However, the injured plaintiff may have
different sources of recovery in North Carolina, depending upon the
type officer involved.
If the plaintiff is injured by a state highway patrolman he may be
entitled to bring an action under the Tort Claims Act. 28  The act has
been strictly construed as being applicable to situations where the state
employee, by a negligent act, injures the plaintiff, and it is not clear
whether a person injured by an officer who is speeding in "reckless
disregard" would be able to recover under the act.2 9
Municipal corporations are empowered by G.S. § 160-191.1 to waive
their immunity to suit by purchasing liability insurance.3 0 The court
has considered this statute only twice, and it is not clear whether it
will apply to negligent operation of police vehicles. 3' It would appear
operated his automobile "carelessly and heedlessly, in wilful disregard of the
rights and safety of others ... "Record, p. 4. The same allegation was made
in his reply to the officer's counterclaim, apparently to set up contributory negli-
gence on the part of the officer as a bar to-recovery on the counterclaim. Record,
p. 12. Therefore, it is questionable if the distinction between the principal case
and the Glosson case is a valid one.
"' State ex rel. Hayes v. Billings, 240 N.C. 78, 81 S.E.2d 150 (1954); Dunn
v. Swanson, 217 N.C. 279, 7 S.E.2d 563 (1940); 47 Am. JuR. Sheriffs, Police,
and Constables §42 (1943).
" N.C. GaN. STAT. §§ 143-291 to -300 (1959).
" In Jenkins v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 244 N.C. 560, 94 S.E.2d 577
(1956), the patrolman intentionally shot a prisoner and recovery under the Tort
Claims Act was denied, the court holding that the act does not permit recovery
for wrongful and intentional injuries but limits recovery to injuries negligently
inflicted. It has also been held that there can be no recovery for a negligent
omission since the statute refers only to a negligent act. Flynn v. North Carolina
State Highway and Public Works Comm'n, 244 N.C. 617, 94 S.E.2d 571 (1956).
In Lowe v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 244 N.C. 353, 93 S.E2d 448 (1956),
a patrolman negligently shot the plaintiff while making an arrest. The court
affirmed recovery under the act although it was argued that pointing a weapon
was an statutory assault. The view stated in RE-STATEmENT, TORTS § 500 (1939)
is that disregard of safety is a higher degree of negligence than ordinary negli-
gence. However, in comment g of the same section it is stated that this difference
of degree is so marked as to amount substantially to a difference in 'kind of
misconduct. It would seem that if the court treats acts of an officer which are
in "reckless disregard of the rights of others" as only a higher degree of neg-
ligence, one so injured could recover under the act. On the other hand, if the
court treats such acts as amounting to a different kind of misconduct, analogous
to intentional misconduct, the Tort Claims Act would not be available to one
injured by the "reckless disregard" to the officer.
"°N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-191.1 (1952). *The city is authorized but not re-
quired to purchase liability insurance. Immunity is waived only as to the amount
of insurance obtained. Once liability insurance is obtained, in the absence of
affirmative action by the city's governing body, the immunity is deemed waived.
The statute is silent as to what type of "affirmative action" is necessary in order
to deny waiver of immunity once the insurance is obtained." In Moore v. Town of Plymouth, 249 N.C. 423, 106 S.E.2d 695 (1959), the
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that the legislature so intended since the statute is directed to the "neg-
ligent operation of any motor vehicle" by a municipal employee during
the course and scope of his emplbyment.
3 2
By G.S. § 153-9(44) any board of county commissioners is em-
powered to secure liability insurance and thereby waive the county's
immunity to suit.33 This statute is directed to any tort claim arising
from the negligence of county employees ;34 it would seem, by implica-
tion, that it would apply to claims arising from the negligent operation
of police vehicles.35
According to the provisions of G.S. § 109-34 every person injured
by the neglect or misconduct of a sheriff is given a right of action
against the sheriff and his surety upon the official bond. 0 In addition,
a sheriff is held liable for the wrongful acts of his deputy, committed
under the color of office, his liability being governed 'by the law appli-
cable to principal and agent.37 While the court has not construed G.S.
§ 109-34 in a case involving the negligent operation of a patrol vehicle
by a sheriff or his deputy, it would seem that this provision would
enable one to sue the surety for damages incurred in such a manner.38
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city was held liable for damages resulting from a collision caused by the negligent
operation of a truck being used by the city for pest control. In Clark v. Scheld,
253 N.C. 732, 117 S.E2d 838 (1961), the city of Lenoir was held not to be
liable for damages incurred in an accident similar to that involved in the Moore
case because there was no showing the city had secured liability insurance.
2The city charter should be examined prior to instituting the action against
the city. Charters usually provide for certain prerequisites which must be met
before bringing suit. The most common of these is the requirement of sufficient
notice of the claim to the city's governing body within a prescribed time. In
Carter v. City of Greensboro, 249 N.C. 328, 106 S.E.2d 564 (1959), the court
said failure to give the city notice of a claim within the time prescribed by its
charter would ordinarily result in a nonsuit unless the plaintiff alleges and
proves justification for the delay of notice and did actually give the city notice
within a reasonable time after the disability was removed.
"'N.C., GEN. STAT. § 153-9(44) (Supp. 1959).
" In Walker v. County of Randolph, 251 N.C. 805, 112 S.E.2d 551 (1960),
the county was sued for the negligent maintenance of its court house.
" It should be noted that the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsi-
bility Act of 1953 does not apply to any motor vehicle owned by the state, to its
operator, nor to the operator of a vehicle owned by a political subdivision of the
state, provided the political subdivision has waived immunity. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-279.32 (Supp. 1959).
" The sheriff is required to execute an official bond payable to the state to
insure the faithful execution of his office. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 162-8 (1952). In
Price v. Honeycutt, 216 N.C. 270, 4 S.E.2d 611 (1939), the court held the surety
liable when the sheriff used excessive force in making a wrongful arrest. In
Dunn v. Swanson, 217 N.C. 279, 7 S.E.2d 563 (1940), the sheriff and his surety
were held liable for the wrongful death of a prisoner which was caused by the
negligence of a jailor.
" Cain v. Corbett, 235 N.C. 33, 69 S.E2d 20 (1952); Dunn v. Swanson,
supra note 36.
" In Cain v. Corbett, supra note 37, the court held that the sheriff, his surety
on the official bond, the deputy, and the deputy's surety were properly joined as
defendants in an action for false arrest which was made by the deputy.
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